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INTRODUCTION

During its 1985 session, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a
new stock corporation statute for Virginia1 ("Revised Statute").
1. Virginia Stock Corporation Act, 1985 Va. Acts 868 (codified at VA.

CODE ANN.

§§ 13.1-
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The new statute became effective January 1, 1986.2 The Revised
Statute represents a complete revision of the Virginia corporation
statute and is the result of a thorough review of prior law. This
article will discuss some of the significant changes in Virginia corporate law effected by the Revised Statute and will offer some
guidelines for the interpretation and application of its provisions.3
601 to -800 (Repl. Vol. 1985)) [hereinafter cited as REVISED STATUTE].
A new non-stock corporation statute, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-801 to -980 (Repl. Vol. 1985),
was enacted at the same time and parallels the Revised Statute. Certain amendments to the
corporate fee and tax structure contained in title 58.1 of the Code were necessitated by the
Revised Statute.
In 1983, the General Assembly directed the Virginia Code Commission ("Code Commission") to study chapters 1 and 2 of title 13.1 of the Code of Virginia, the then existing Stock
Corporation and Non-Stock Corporation Acts, for the purpose of proposing significant revisions to those statutes. H.J. Res. 3, 1983 Va. Acts 1243. This study was prompted by revisions to the Model Act which had recently been approved or were pending and by the fact
that a complete review of the Virginia statutes was thought to be due.
As a part of this study, an initial draft of the Revised Statute was prepared by Allen C.
Goolsby, III, Esq. in 1983 at the Code Commission's request. In late 1983 and the first half
of 1984, a joint committee of the Virginia State Bar and the Virginia Bar Association reviewed and commented on Mr. Goolsby's draft. Mr. Goolsby revised his draft to take into
account some of the Joint Committee's concerns and the then still unfolding Model Act. He
submitted his final draft statute to the Code Commission in June, 1984. A set of comments
prepared by the Joint Committee was submitted to the Code Commission in July, 1984.
During the fall of 1984, the Code Commission reviewed, and held a series of hearings on,
the draft statute. In January, 1985, the Code Commission submitted to the Governor and
General Assembly its report on the review of the Stock Corporation Act, the Non-Stock
Corporation Act and the fee and tax amendments. In this report, the Code Commission
recommended that the revisions to these statutes as contained in the report be enacted. VA.
CODE CoMMON, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 OF TITLE 13.1 OF THE CODE OF
VIRGINIA,

H. Doc. No. 13 (1985) [hereinafter cited as

CODE COMMSSION REPORT].

Appendix 1 to the Code Commission Report contains the text of the proposed revised
stock corporation and non-stock corporation statutes. Appendix 3 contains the proposed
amendments to title 58.1. The comments of the Joint Committee on the proposed revised
stock corporation statute are contained as Appendix 4 to the Code Commission Report. The
text of the Revised Statute is virtually the same as that contained in Appendix 1 to the
Code Commission Report, the adoption of which the Code Commission recommended.
The Revised Statute is not merely an extensive set of amendments to the prior statute,
Virginia Stock Corporation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1 to -200 (Repl. Vol. 1978) [hereinafter cited as OLD STATUTE]. Instead, the Old Statute was repealed in its entirety upon the
effective date of the Revised Statute.
2. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, article 14, "Affiliated Transactions," became effective
July 1, 1985. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-725 to -728.
3. This article will not discuss every change made by the Revised Statute. And because of
the short period of time that has elapsed since the statute's passage, this article will not be
as thorough a scholarly exegesis as has been produced with respect to some other corporation statutes. See, e.g., E. FOLK, THE DELAwARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW (1972); Folk,
Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law, The Robinson Treatise Reviewed and
Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. REv. 768 (1965).
The statute as set out in Appendix 1 to the CODE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1,
contains a very helpful statement after each section, noting some of the differences between
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The Revised Statute embodies most of the provisions of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 4 ("Model Act"), which had
been undergoing a thorough revision over the last several years. In
fact, the desire to conform the Virginia statute to the most recent
version of the Model Act was perhaps the most important motive
prompting enactment of the Revised Statute.
Other purposes are evident in the Revised Statute. For example,
certain provisions have been drafted to protect Virginia corporations from hostile takeovers. Also, while there is no separate optional chapter for closely held corporations as in some jurisdictions,5 some provisions of the Revised Statute evidence a
recognition of the special problems of small, closely held
corporations.
In general, the Revised Statute adopts the Model Act's approach, except in those instances where prior Virginia law' was
thought to be more advantageous or where difficulty with the language or effect of the Model Act's position was perceived. With
several extremely important exceptions, the Revised Statute
closely follows either the Model Act or prior Virginia law.
Since the Revised Statute is largely an adaptation of the Model
Act, Virginia, in enacting it, has become one of the first states to
adopt the most recent version of the Model Act.7 The advantages
the proposed provision and the then existing comparable Virginia Code provision, and the
relationship between it and the comparable Model Act provision.
4. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT (1985) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT]. The
Model Act had been under revision for quite some time. Revisions to certain provisions had
been approved during the last few years. See, e.g., infra notes 43 & 157. A draft of the
revised Model Act, including those portions previously approved, was circulated for comment in 1983. See MODEL AcT (Exposure Draft 1983) [hereinafter cited as ExPosuRa
DRAFr].
5. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 158 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1974);
MD. CoRPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to -603 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
6. Throughout this article, the term "prior Virginia law" refers to the Virginia Stock Corporation Act as it exited until January 1, 1986, OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-1 to -200,
and the case law.
7. Virginia thus carries on a tradition of being among the first states to conform its statute to the Model Act. Virginia's Stock Corporation Act was extensively revised in 1956 to
conform to the early versions of the Model Act. See Emerson, Vital Weaknesses in the New
Virginia Stock CorporationAct and the Model Act, 42 VA. L. REv. 489 (1956); Gibson, The
Virginia CorporationLaw of 1956, 42 VA. L. REv. 445, 603 (1956). In the intervening 30
years, the Virginia statute has been amended piecemeal to reflect some of the revisions to
the Model Act. It has been ten years since major changes have been made to the statute. In
1975 some significant amendments were introduced which updated and conformed the statute to the Model Act.
For an analysis and discussion of the older versions of the Model Act, see the authorities
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of following a national model are obvious. The provisions have
been thoroughly considered by a number of very prominent practitioners and scholars. The Official Comments to each section of the
Model Act should serve as a guide to the interpretation of the Revised Statute's provisions." The evolving case law from jurisdictions having substantially the same provisions can be persuasive
authority in the interpretation and application of the Revised
Statute. 9
II. ANALYSIS OF THE REVISED STATUTE
Functionally, the Revised Statute is divided into twenty articles.
The corpus of statutory material contained in the thirteen articles
comprising the former statute 0 ("Old Statute") has been somewhat subdivided and rearranged within these twenty articles.
A.

Article One-General Provisions1"

Article One includes expanded definitional sections. 2 In addition it contains provisions regarding notice and filing of documents
with the State Corporation Commission ("Commission"). The requirement for local filing of certificates issued by the Commission
has been retained in Revised Statute section 13.1-605.
One extremely helpful change is the provision for deferred effective dates in Revised Statute section 13.1-606(A). Normally, the effective date of a certificate issued by the Commission is the date of
the certificate. Prior law and practice proved rather inflexible on
cited in Murphy, Redemption of Stock Under the Model Business CorporationAct and the
Virginia Stock CorporationAct, 14 U. RIcH. L. REv. 311, 311 n.1, 316 n.10, 321 n.15 (1980).
8. Since Virginia publishes little legislative history for its statutes, the Official Comments
to the Model Act ought to be considered a fertile source in the interpretation and application of the Revised Statute. The Comments of the Joint Bar Committee, CODE COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, app. 4, are also helpful.
9. The relatively small number of reported Virginia cases in the corporate law area makes
the case law of other jurisdictions having comparable provisions extremely important.
10. Article 13 of the Old Statute, dealing with Industrial Development Corporations, has
been removed from the Stock Corporation Act and placed as a separate chapter within title
13.1. See REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-981 to -998.
11. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-601 to -614.
12. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-603, -610, -611, for example, define the following terms: articles of incorporation, certificate, commission, conspicuous, domestic and foreign corporation, deliver, distribution, effective date, employee, entity, principal office, proceeding, record date, share, shareholder, state, subscriber, United States, voting group,
notice, and number of shareholders. Many of these terms will be discussed in connection
with the substantive provisions employing them.
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this point. Revised Statute section 13.1-606(A), in contrast, pro-

vides that the articles13 based upon which the certificate is issued
may state an effective date up to fifteen days after the date of issuance. This flexibility may be extremely helpful in facilitating the
conclusion of many corporate transactions such as mergers. 14
B. Article Two-Fees 5
Article Two prescribes the fees to be collected by the
Commission.
C. Article Three-Formationof Corporations6
Article Three provides for the formation of corporations. Revised Statute section 13.1-618 continues the limited role of incorporators. Their sole function is to sign and file the articles of incorporation with the Commission. Since "person" is defined in
Revised Statute section 13.1-603 as an individual or an entity, a
corporation can serve as an incorporator.
Revised Statute section 13.1-619(A) lists the information which
must be set forth in the articles of incorporation. This section does
not substantively differ from Old Statute section 13.1-49, except
that it eliminates the required statement of purpose. 7 Revised
Statute section 13.1-619(B) expands, or at least makes more explicit, the optional clauses which may be included in the articles.
Of particular advantange to the closely held corporation is the
allowance of provisions "[riegarding the management of the business and.

. .

affairs of the corporation" and those "[d]efining, lim-

iting, and regulating the powers of the corporation, its directors,
and shareholders."' This section explicitly acknowledges, to a
greater degree than the Old Statute did, the possibility of molding
the roles of the directors and shareholders in managing the affairs
13. "Articles" are defined in REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-603, to include articles
of incorporation and all amendments thereto, and articles of merger.
14. It was sometimes difficult under the Old Statute to coordinate filings in the states of
incorporation of the parties to a merger so as to assure effectiveness on the same day the
Commission issued the certificate of merger.
15. REVISED STATUtE, supra note 1,

§§

13.1-615 to -617.

16. Id. §§ 13.1-618 to -625.
17. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
18. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-619(B)(3)(b) & (c). The Official Comment to
MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 2.02, on which this section is based, contains a helpful list of
common types of optional provisions.
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of a closely held corporation in order to give the shareholders a
more active role.
Revised Statute section 13.1-619(B)(3) is introduced by the qualifying language that optional provisions included in the articles not
be inconsistent with law. This section, therefore, does not expressly
validate any particular management allocation provision. The legality of such provisions must be determined by other portions of
the statute or by the case law.
Revised Statute section 13.1-622, which has no analog in the Old
Statute, provides that persons purporting to act on behalf of a corporation knowing that there is no incorporation are jointly and
severally liable for the liabilities created while so acting. They are
not liable, however, to persons who also know that there is no incorporation. This provision follows from the Model Act's position
that corporate existence begins upon issuance of the certificate of
incorporation. If conduct is engaged in, or liability incurred, before
corporate existence, those persons acting for or as a corporation
must be personally responsible.19
Unlike the Model Act, however, the Revised Statute qualifies
this liability. Under section 13.1-622, the persons acting for or as a
corporation are not liable to persons who also knew there was no
incorporation. This exception thus allows a limited version of "corporation by estoppel."2 0 Section 13.1-622 confers, in this narrow
instance, the advantage of limited liability on persons acting for or
as a corporation even though they know that in fact there is no
effective corporation. Therefore, it probably ought to be narrowly
construed to operate only against persons having actual knowledge,
not just reason to know, of the lack of corporate status.

19. The doctrine of de facto corporations is mooted by the Model Act. Liability is limited
to those persons acting as, or on behalf of, the purported corporation. Passive investors are
not liable. MOD L ACT, supra note 4, §§ 2.03, 2.04, 2.04 official comment; see Timberlane
Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109 (1973).
20. See Cranson v. International Business Machs., 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964). The
concept of "corporation by estoppel" is based on the premise that the plaintiff, often a
creditor, intended to deal with the entity and not with the individuals as such. Plaintiff
therefore ought to be limited to seeking recourse only from the entity with which he in fact
intended to deal.

74
D.
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Article Four-Purposesand Powers21

Article Four contains those sections dealing with the corporation's purposes and powers. Revised Statute section 13.1-626 states
that, unless a limited purpose is stated in the articles of incorporation or is required by law, a corporation's purpose is to engage "in
any lawful business." Old Statute section 13.1-49(b) allowed a corporation to adopt this broad purpose by specific provision in the
articles. The Revised Statute reverses this presumption and states
that a corporation has this broad purpose unless it adopts, or is
required by law to have, a narrower purpose. Thus, nothing need
be stated in the articles about purpose unless a narrower one is
desired.2 2
Revised Statute section 13.1-627 corresponds to Old Statute section 13.1-2.1 and lists the statutory powers conferred on corporations unless limited by the articles. This section carries forward
into the Revised Statute some broader authorizations than are
contained in the Model Act analog, section 3.02. For example, it
sanctions payments to officers, directors and employees for previously rendered services, even though the payments are not made
pursuant to a prior agreement. It also confers the power to obtain
life insurance on any officer, director or employee, and on any
shareholder for the purpose of acquiring his shares on death.
While this extensive list of powers is helpful, it is probably not
necessary. The introductory portions of both Revised Statute section 13.1-627 and Model Act section 3.02 state that a corporation
has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or
convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including without
limitation those powers listed. Arguably, if the section ended after
that grant of power, it would not be more restrictive than as
drafted with the list. This list is nonetheless useful for illustrative
purposes.2 3
21. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-626 to -629.
22. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-619, makes this point clear. It lists in section
13.1-619(A) the four elements which must be included in the articles of incorporation: (1)
the name; (2) the number of authorized shares; (3) the distinguishing rights of shares if
more than one class is authorized; and (4) the name of the registered agent and the address
of the registered office. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-619(B)(3)(a), states that a
corporation may set forth in the articles "the purpose or purposes for which the corporation
is organized." The Official Comment to MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 3.01, notes that, because
the allowance of the broad purpose clause is almost universal among the states, there appears to be no reason not to make it the norm.

23.

REVISED STATUTE,

supra note 1, § 13.1-627(A)(17), like

OLD STATUTE,

supra note 1, §
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Revised Statute section 13.1-629 carries forward the thrust of
Old Statute section 13.1-5 in strictly limiting the viability of the
ultra vires doctrine. Section 13.1-629(A) states the general proposition that corporate action generally cannot be challenged on the
ground that the corporation lacked the power to act; and section
13.1-629(B) states the three instances in which the lack of authority can be raised.
The wording of this section makes it clear that completed corporate conduct, even if unauthorized, cannot be set aside to the disadvantage of the other party to the transaction. Given the prevalence of the broad corporate purpose clause and the power to do
"all things necessary or convenient" to accomplish the broad purpose, the likelihood of challenge to corporate action under this section is not great.
The section does not substantively change, however, the provisions of Old Statute section 13.1-5 in stating the three grounds on
which the lack of authority can be raised. The corporation's lack of
power to act may be challenged by a shareholder suing to enjoin
the act. This ground, of course, would apply to corporate action
not yet concluded. The corporation may sue for damages the individuals performing the unauthorized act. And finally, a proceeding
seeking involuntary dissolution may be brought before the
Commission.
24
E. Article Five-Name; Article Six-Office and Agent

Article Five contains three sections regarding corporate names,
their reservation and registration. A separate section provides, as
did old Statute section 13.1-127, for the Commission's issuance of a
certificate reciting the change of corporate name or succession to
ownership. This certificate may be admitted to record in the recording office where corporate property is located to maintain the
continuity of title records.
Article Six's provisions regarding the registered office and agent
make explicit the limited role of the registered agent. Revised Statute section 13.1-634(B) provides that the sole function of the registered agent is to forward to the corporation any notice served on
13.1-2.1(q), in an effort at "overkill," contains a final catch-all clause allowing a corporation
to have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect its purposes.
24. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-630 to -633 (Article 5); id. §§ 13.1-634 to -637

(Article 6).
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him. Revised Statute section 13.1-636 adds a procedure whereby
the registered agent may resign.2 5
26

F. Article Seven-Shares and Distributions

Article Seven, dealing with shares and distributions, differs substantially from the Old Statute in its treatment of these issues.
Revised Statute section 13.1-638, regarding authorized shares,
covers the concepts contained in Old Statute sections 13.1-12 and 13. Revised Statute section 13.1-638(A), like Old Statute section
13.1-12, states that the corporation shall have such classes of
shares and authorized number of shares as are stated in the articles of incorporation. If more than one class is authorized, the relative rights, preferences and distinguishing designations of the classes must be stated in the articles of incorporation. The statute
contains no reference to par value.
Section 13.1-638(B) requires every corporation to authorize one
or more classes of shares possessing the two fundamental rights of
plenary voting power and of receiving the net assets of the corporation on dissolution. The same class of shares need not possess
both of these rights. 28 In addition, as stated in Revised Statute section 13.1-638(C), the articles of incorporation may authorize one or
more classes having the typical rights and preferences of preferred
shares, including special voting, liquidation, redemption or conversion features.
The traditional terms "common," "preferred" and "special" classes of shares are intentionally omitted from the Revised Statute.
Neither the precise definition of these categories nor their legal significance has been clear for many years. 29 Although section 13.1638(A) requires a specific descriptive designation for each class, it
assigns no legal consequence to the descriptive designation. Accordingly, articulation of the relative rights of the classes of shares
in the articles is extremely important.
25. A comparable provision was deleted from the Old Statute in 1981.
26. REVISED STATUTg, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-638 to -653.
27. See generally infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. Under the Old Statute, charter, entrance and annual registration fees and franchise taxes for stock corporations were
based on the amount of authorized capital stock. Elimination of the concept of par value
necessitated a change in the basis used to compute these fees and taxes. They will be based
on the number of authorized shares. See VA. CODE ANN. tit. 58.1 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
28. See MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 6.01 official comment.
29. See id. § 6.01(B) official comment; Murphy, supra note 7, at 331-39.
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Revised Statute section 13.1-638(C)(2) adds flexibility with respect to the redemption or conversion of shares. It specifically allows the terms or formula by which the redemption price or conversion ratio is determined to be stated in the articles of
incorporation, or to be determined by extrinsic data or events
identified in the articles.3 0 Moreover, the shares can be made redeemable at the option of the holder, the corporation or some
other person. Old Statute section 13.1-13(a) authorized provisions
providing for redemption at the option of the corporation. The Revised Statute balances this right by providing for redemption at
the option of the corporation or shareholder.
Revised Statute section 13.1-638(B) clearly states that every corporation must have at least one class of shares possessing plenary
voting rights and one class having the right to receive the net assets of the corporation upon dissolution. If more than one class of
shares is authorized, the precise rights of all classes must be stated
in the articles so that it is clear which class has these fundamental
rights.
It is somewhat unclear whether a statement of the voting and
net asset distribution rights must be articulated in the articles if
only one class is authorized. Revised Statute section 13.1-638(A)
supports the argument that they need not be. It states that if more
than one class is authorized, the articles must state the distinguishing characteristics and rights of each class. But Revised Statute section 13.1-638(B) requires that the articles authorize one or
more classes possessing plenary voting and net asset distribution
rights.
The Official Comment to Model Act section 6.01 states that if
only one class is authorized, no statement of the rights need be
made. If two or more classes are authorized, one of which possesses
these fundamental rights, that class need only be described as
"common shares" or shares having general distribution and voting
rights.3 1 This instruction does assign legal consequences to the
term "common shares," even though the thrust of the Model Act
generally is to focus on the statement of rights in the articles.
Revised Statute section 13.1-639 carries forward the notion of
30. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 324-29.
31. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 6.01 official comment. Since REVISED STATUTE, supra note
1, § 13.1-638(A) & (B), substantially tracks the language of MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 6.01,
this explanation should resolve any doubt on this point.

78
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"blank stock." It allows the board of directors, if so authorized by
the articles, to define the rights of any class of shares by filing an
amendment to the articles before any shares of the class are issued.
Revised Statute section 13.1-640 is new to Virginia law. This section first authorizes the corporation to issue up to the number of
shares of each class stated in the articles of incorporation. These
issued shares are outstanding until they are reacquired, redeemed,
converted or cancelled pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1653. Revised Statute section 13.1-640(C) allows, if the articles so
provide, all shares to be redeemed, whether they are called preferred or common, so long as one share remains outstanding which
possesses plenary voting and net asset distribution rights.
This provision resolves the uncertainty in prior law regarding
whether common shares can be redeemed. By one school of
thought they could, if a class of non-redeemable common shares
remained outstanding. This, in turn, led to the question of whether
the redeemable shares were in fact common, preferred or a special
class. 3 2 Revised Statute section 13.1-640 eliminates the issue by allowing all shares to be redeemed so long as one share possessing
plenary rights remains outstanding.
Revised Statute section 13.1-641, dealing with fractional shares,
changes prior Virginia law. It provides the board of directors with
a range of options in dealing with fractional interests. The board
may issue fractional shares or pay in money the value of the fractional interest. It may also arrange for the disposition of the fractional shares, or it may issue scrip.
Old Statute section 13.1-21 did not authorize the issuance of
fractional shares, except in open-end investment trusts; it allowed
only the issuance of scrip or payment of the value of the fractional
share. Revised Statute section 13.1-641 is introduced by the language "[a] corporation may, if authorized by its board of directors. . . ." (emphasis added). Consequently, the board is able to
exercise its discretion and determine in any instance how to deal
with fractional interests.
Revised Statute section 13.1-643, regarding the issuance of
shares, is one of the first sections, in order of occurrence, to give
effect to the Model Act's revised financial provisions;33 and it sig32. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 331-39.
33. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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nificantly changes prior Virginia law contained in Old Statute sections 13.1-17 and -18. The concepts of par value, stated capital,
earned and capital surplus, and treasury stock have been eliminated from the Model Act. The Revised Statute follows this
change. Accordingly, the allocation of the consideration received
for shares to stated capital and capital surplus, as provided in Old
Statute section 13.1-18, and the determination of the consideration
which must be paid for newly issued or treasury shares, as stated
in Old Statute sections 13.1-17 and -18, are unnecessary. In their
place, Revised Statute section 13.1-643(B) first states that any issuance of shares must be authorized by the board, then lists the
types of consideration which may be accepted in exchange for
shares. This list includes any tangible or intangible property or
benefit to the corporation, including cash, property, promissory
notes, or past or future services.
This list of valid types of consideration does not depart from
prior Virginia law.3 4 However, Revised Statute section 13.1-643(C)
does change prior Virginia law. By its terms, the good faith determination of the board that the consideration received or to be received by the corporation is adequate is conclusive. Upon receipt
of this consideration, the shares are deemed to be fully paid and
non-assessable. The board is not required by this section to determine the adequacy of the value of the consideration for all purposes. The "adequacy" determination required by this section establishes only whether the shares are validly issued and fully paid.
Old Statute section 13.1-17 required that the directors place a dollar value on the consideration, and this valuation was deemed conclusive in the absence of fraud. 5 Moreover, the "absence of fraud"
standard used in the Old Statute has been replaced in this section
by a "good faith standard."
Shares issued in exchange for promissory notes or contracts for
future services are deemed to be fully paid, assuming the board's
determination of the adequacy of consideration, when it accepts
the promissory note or the contract for services. Revised Statute
section 13.1-643(D) contains some protective measures (including
34. The prohibition on acceptance of promissory notes or future services was eliminated
from OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-17, in 1975.

35. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 6.21 official comment, notes that the directors need not,
but may, place specific dollar value on noncash consideration. The comment recognizes that
some value must be placed on consideration for accounting purposes, but that the determination of such values is not necessarily the responsibility of the board.

80

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:67

escrow of the shares, transfer restriction and credit of distributions) which a corporation may employ to insure that the services
are performed or the note paid. These measures do not affect the
fully paid and non-assessable status of the shares; they only provide security for performance or payment.
Finally, Revised Statute section 13.1-643 does not allow the
shareholders to restrict the board's authority to issue shares, as did
Old Statute section 13.1-17. Section 13.1-643 authorizes the board
to issue the shares, and it sets forth the procedures under which
the shares may be issued. It does allow the shareholders to reserve
for themselves this same prerogative by a provision in the articles
of incorporation. It appears, however, that the substantive provisions of the section cannot be modified. If no provision is contained in the articles, the board will perform this function on the
terms stated in section 13.1-643. With a provision in the articles,
the shareholders will perform this function, but under the same
terms and procedures stated in the section.
Revised Statute section 13.1-644 provides that the sole liability
of the shareholder is to pay the consideration for which the shares
were authorized to be issued to him. Revised Statute section 13.1644(B) fixes this amount as the consideration which the board or
the shareholders determine in good faith to be adequate.3 6
Revised Statute section 13.1-649 codifies principles that perhaps
existed, albeit inchoate, in prior Virginia law.37 It explicitly authorizes share transfer restrictions, be they in the articles of incorporation, bylaws, a shareholders' agreement, or an agreement between the corporation and shareholders.
Revised Statute section 13.1-649(B) makes such restrictions enforceable against a holder or any transferee if the restriction is
noted on the share certificate or contained in the information
statement required with respect to uncertificated shares. It is not
otherwise enforceable against a person without knowledge of the
restriction.
36. A transferee in good faith, and without knowledge that the consideration has not been
paid, would not be liable to the corporation or creditors for any unpaid portion of the consideration; but the original holder would remain liable.
37. See OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-24. Reasonable restrictions on the transfer of
stock were permissible under prior law because the corporation's charter was viewed as a
contract between the corporation and its shareholders, as well as between the shareholders
themselves. However, such restrictions were strictly construed by the courts. See Monacan
Hills v. Page, 203 Va. 110, 122 S.E.2d 654 (1961).
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Revised Statute section 13.1-649(C) sanctions restrictions intended to serve any reasonable purpose, including preservation of
securities act exemptions or closely held corporation status. Section 13.1-649(D) lists typical transfer and registration restrictions,
including the right of first refusal or option, approval before transfer, and prohibition of transfer to designated classes of persons, if
the class is not unreasonable.
Revised Statute section 13.1-651 maintains the traditional Virginia approach to preemptive rights.3 8 They exist unless limited or
denied in the articles of incorporation. Although Revised Statute
section 13.1-651 confers the right generally, it continues the common practice of denying the right with respect to shares offered for
other than money or to officers or employees pursuant to plans approved by the shareholders. Moreover, the right does not extend to
shares having distribution preferences, shares without general voting power, or to shares having preferential rights to distributions
unless they are convertible into shares without that right. In all of
these instances, the preemptive right would exist only if specifically provided in the articles of incorporation.
Revised Statute section 13.1-653(G) clarifies the corporation's
right to issue the shares not acquired by the present shareholders
pursuant to their preemptive right. The corporation may offer
these shares to others for a period of one year at a price not lower
than that offered to the existing shareholders. If the shares are offered after one year or at a lower price, the preemptive right is
again triggered.
The statutory qualifications on the preemptive right make it a
less attractive right than may initially appear. The right is particularly important in the closely held corporation context, when relative voting position is critical. Yet the statutory exemptions present the corporation or majority shareholder with various ways of
avoiding the right. Shares issued for property or services, for example, do not trigger the right. Consequently, holders of preemptive
rights cannot take too much comfort in them. 9
38. This section is more complete than OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-23, but does
not substantively differ from it; and it follows MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 6.30, except in
the "opt out" variant. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 6.30, provides, like the law of many
states, that preemptive rights do not exist unless provided for in the articles. A statement in
the articles to the effect that the corporation elects to have preemptive rights is sufficient to
confer statutory preemptive rights.
39. Any abusive avoidance of the preemptive right by a corporation or its majority share-
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Revised Statute section 13.1-652 authorizes a corporation to reacquire shares of its stock and states the consequence of the reacquisition on the corporation's capital structure. The shares on reacquisition are returned to the status of authorized but unissued
shares. They can be freely reissued unless the articles of incorporation prohibit reissue. If reissue is prohibited, the authorized number of shares in the class is reduced on reacquisition by the number of reacquired shares through an amendment to the articles of
incorporation. In this event, the corporation is obligated to adopt,
by action of the board without shareholder approval, an amendment to the articles and to file it with the Commission.
Elimination of the concepts of par value, stated capital, earned
and capital surplus, and treasury shares from the Revised Statute
greatly simplifies the procedures for and accounting consequences
of share reacquisitions. 4 0 Elimination of these accounting concepts
also has the salutary effect of eliminating the distinction between a
reacquisition and a redemption. Consequently, the separate provisions regarding a redemption set forth in Old Statute section 13.141
62 have not been retained.
Since a reacquisition of shares fits within the definition of a distribution, 42 Revised Statute section 13.1-652 merely states the consequence of the reacquisition to the corporation's authorized capital. The question of whether a corporation may reacquire shares
and the impact of the reacquisition on the financial position of the
corporation are governed by Revised Statute section 13.1-653,
which authorizes distributions to shareholders.
Section 13.1-653 is probably the capstone of the financial provisions in the Revised Statute. This section is an enactment of
Model Act section 6.40 without change. It thereby gives full effect
to the Model Act's aim of revising the accounting and financial
provisions to better reflect today's financial realities.4 3 Elimination
holder would raise issues of fiduciary duty, however.
40. The procedures for cancellation of shares and reduction in capital as contained in OLD
supra note 1, §§ 13.1-63, -64, are no longer necessary and have not been carried
over into the Revised Statute.
41. See generally Murphy, supra note 7.
42. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-603.
43. See Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct-Amendments to FinancialProvisions, A Report of the Committee on CorporateLaws, 34 Bus. LAW. 1867 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Changes]. The revised financial provisions of the Model Act are essentially contained in this report. They were adopted by the Committee on Corporate Laws in 1980.
Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct-Amendments to Financial Provisions:A
STATUTE,
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of the concepts of par value, stated capital, earned and capital surplus, and treasury shares from the definitional and operational sections of the Revised Statute surely provides flexibility in accounting for both the consideration received for shares and their
reacquisition. However, it is in the context of a distribution to
shareholders that the full significance of these changes is
apparent. 4
A distribution is defined in Revised Statute section 13.1-603 as a
"transfer of money or other property, except its own shares, or incurrence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of
its shareholders in respect of any of its shares." A distribution thus
includes transactions commonly thought of as dividends, share
purchases, redemptions and liquidation distributions; and the currency for these distributions is money, property or debt.
Revised Statute section 13.1-653(A) authorizes the board to
make any distribution to shareholders, subject only to any restriction in the articles of incorporation and Revised Statute section
13.1-653(C). Thus, the requirements of the Old Statute-that dividends be paid or that shares be repurchased only out of earned or
capital surplus, and that stated capital not be paid out to the
shareholders until liquidation-have been abandoned. 45 Under Revised Statute section 13.1-653, a corporation is free to pay out virtually its entire net worth to its shareholders, subject to Revised
Statute section 13.1-653(C).
Section 13.1-653(C) sets forth two constraints on distributions,
the "equity" and "balance sheet" solvency limitations. No distribution can be made under this section if, after giving effect to it,
the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become
due in the usual course of business (equity solvency), or if its total
assets would be less than its liabilities and the amount of any liquidation preference of shares senior to the class receiving the distribution (balance sheet solvency).
Report of the Committee on CorporateLaws, 35 Bus. LAW. 1365 (1980). The commentary
contained in Changes has been somewhat reworked in the Official Comment to MODEL ACT,
supra note 4, § 6.40.

44. See generally B.

MANNING,

A

CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPIrAL

(2d ed. 1981);

Murphy, Equity Insolvency and the New Model Business CorporationAct, 15 U. RICH. L.
REV. 839 (1981); Note, The 1980 Amendments to the FinancialProvisions of the Model
Business CorporationAct: A Positive Alternative to the New York Statutory Approach, 47
ALB. L. REV. 1019 (1983).
45. See generally B. MANNING, supra note 44, at 165-80; Murphy, supra note 44.
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Although section 13.1-653(C) frees corporate managers from the
artificial constraints of earned and capital surplus, it does require
of them some sophisticated judgments about the corporation's future. Revised Statute section 13.1-653(D) allows these solvency determinations to be based on financial statements prepared on the
basis of accounting practices which are reasonable under the circumstances, or on fair valuation or any other reasonable method.
Once the accounting method is chosen, the balance sheet solvency test is fairly easy to apply. However, the equity solvency test
requires careful analysis of the corporation's liquidity and the future course of its business. Unfortunately, the analysis and judgments it demands are not within the everyday experience of many
directors, especially those of small closely held corporations.4"
Revised Statute section 13.1-653(E) states that the tests are to
be applied generally on the earlier of the dates the money is paid
or the indebtedness incurred. If the distribution is made by promissory note or installment payment, the operative date is the date
on which the obligation is incurred, not the date on which it is
paid.47
The Official Comment to Model Act section 6.40 notes that the
two solvency judgments are used to determine both the validity of
the distribution and the liability of the directors for improper distributions. It acknowledges that comparable solvency standards are
used in the bankruptcy and fraudulent conveyance settings for
other purposes. The comment, however, states that, in view of the
46. Fortunately, the Official Comment to MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 6.40, contains helpful guidance with respect to the framework within which these judgments must be made and
offers a methodology to be employed. The comment indicates that application of the equity
solvency test requires a cash flow analysis, based on a business forecast and budget, for a
time period sufficient to assess whether known liabilities reasonably can be expected to be
met as they mature. The equity solvency test is not new, it has been a separate test under
the Old Statute and almost every other state's corporation law for decades. However, it now
assumes a greater importance. See Murphy, supra note 44. Although that article discusses
the financial provisions and comments as contained in Changes, supra note 43, the text of
the relevant provisions is virtually unchanged and the Official Comments are not substantively different from the commentary in Changes.
47. An argument can be made that the test should be applied on the date of payment
since until that time no money actually leaves the corporation. See Williams v. Nevelow, 513
S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1974). However, payment of the indebtedness often would be made as a
routine corporate matter with no review by the board. Moreover, incurrence of the debt is
sufficient for balance sheet solvency purposes since the amount of the debt is a liability.
Likewise for equity solvency purposes, the obligation to make the payment in the future is a.
factor to be considered in the cash flow analysis required to determine if the distribution
can be made.
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differing purposes of these laws, it is unnecessary that these tests
as applied under the Model Act be interpreted identically to the
solvency tests employed in those settings. Accordingly the body of
case and statutory law from those fields should not be controlling
for corporate law purposes. 8
49
G. Article Eight-Shareholders

Article Eight of the Revised Statute contains the provisions relating to shareholder action at meetings or otherwise.
Revised Statute section 13.1-654, regarding annual meetings, is
comparable to Old Statute section 13.1-25, except that it codifies
the common law rule that failure to hold an annual meeting does
not affect the validity of any corporate action.
Revised Statute section 13.1-655 deals with special shareholder
meetings. This section changes prior Virginia law and is an attempt to protect Virginia corporations from unwanted takeovers.
Revised Statute section 13.1-655(A)(1) is based on the Delaware
statute,5 0 not the Model Act. It states that a special meeting shall
be held at the call of the board, its chairman, the president of the
corporation or the persons authorized by the articles of incorporation. Therefore, shareholders cannot demand a special meeting unless they are authorized to do so in the articles. Thus, without an
article provision the holders of even a majority of the shares could
not demand a meeting for the purpose of removing a director or
considering a merger proposal.
Old Statute section 13.1-25 allowed the holders of ten percent of
the shares to demand a meeting.5 1 It was generally thought that
this ten percent provision could not be varied in the articles of
incorporation or bylaws.52 This provision, allowing a demand by a
48. Since there is relatively little corporate distribution solvency case law, the inclination
would be to look to the bankruptcy and fraudulent conveyance solvency case law, which is
highly developed on these points. The comment may caution against this inclination.
49. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-654 to -672.
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
51. MODEL ACr, supra note 4, § 7.02, provides that a special meeting may be called at the
demand of the listed persons or the holders of 10% of the shares entitled to vote on the
issue-a provision very similar to OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-25.
52. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-25, stated that special meetings may be called "by
the chairman. . ., president, the board of directors, the holders of not less than one tenth of
all shares entitled to vote at the meeting, or such other officers or persons as may be authorized in the articles of incorporation or the bylaws." The statute specifically provided the
percentage of shareholders which could call a special meeting. It did not allow this provision
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fairly low percentage of the shares, may have made Virginia corporations particularly vulnerable to takeover. Since the ten percent
shareholder demand provision was widely thought to be
mandatory, there was no need, or value, in having a provision in
the articles of incorporation on this point. The Revised Statute
thus substantively changes Virginia law on this point. Without a
provision in the articles, the shareholders in many Virginia corporations have no right to demand a shareholders' meeting.
Revised Statute section 13.1-655(A)(2) states a separate, additional rule for small corporations. By its terms, in addition to the
listed persons, twenty percent of the shares entitled to vote on the
issue to be considered may demand 53 a shareholders' meeting of
corporations having thirty-five or fewer shareholders of record. Revised Statute section 13.1-655(B) allows an increase or decrease in
the percentage of shares which may demand a meeting. By analogy, Revised Statute section 13.1-655(A)(1) would presumably
sanction any percentage for shareholder demand in the overthirty-five-shareholder corporation, if specifically stated in the articles of incorporation.
Revised Statute section 13.1-655(E) makes explicit that only the
matters stated in the notice may be considered at a special
meeting.
Revised Statute section 13.1-656 is a remedial section, allowing a
court to order the holding of an annual or special meeting if it is
not held on proper demand. The court is authorized to fix the time
for the meeting and to determine the shares entitled to notice and
voting rights. Model Act section 7.03, on which section 13.1-656 is
based, also allows the court to establish special quorum requirements for a court-ordered meeting. Such a provision avoids the situation in which a majority shareholder stays away from a meeting
for the purpose of frustrating the quorum, with the consequence
that the meeting cannot be held. Revised Statute section 13.1-656
does not include this provision. Under section 13.1-656, a court
to be modified by the articles or bylaws. It was only if the last words of the section ("or
persons as may be authorized") were interpreted to apply to a different percentage of shareholders that the one-tenth provision could have been modified. See OLD STATUTE, supra
note 1, § 13.1-25.
53. The shareholders make this demand by delivering written dated demands to the secretary of the corporation, stating the purpose for which a meeting is demanded. The date
the first shareholder signs the demand is the date of record for determining which shareholders are entitled to make the demand.
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may order the meeting and require that notice be given; but the
section does not upset any strategy among the shareholders to
frustrate the quorum." The usual quorum and voting rules apply.
Revised Statute section 13.1-657 fills gaps in the Old Statute regarding action without a meeting. Any shareholder action can be
taken without a meeting by the unanimous written consent of the
shareholders entitled to vote on the matter. To be valid, the consent must state the date on which each shareholder signed. The
corporate action evidenced by the consent is deemed to be taken
by the shareholders and is effective according to its terms when all
the written consents are in the possession of the corporation. A
shareholder may withdraw his consent by written notice of withdrawal to the corporation before all consents have been received by
it."5
Revised Statute section 13.1-658 extends from fifty to sixty days
the maximum time period in advance of an annual or special meeting by which notice must be given." Unless otherwise fixed, the
record date, for purposes of determining the shareholders entitled
to notice and to vote, is the close of business on the day before the
effective date of notice.
Revised Statute section 13.1-659 states, more precisely than Old
Statute section 13.1-27, the procedure for waiver of notice. Waiver
is either by written waiver delivered to the secretary of the corporation or by attendance at the meeting. Under Revised Statute section 13.1-659(B), attendance at the meeting constitutes a waiver of
any objection to lack of, or defective, notice unless at the beginning
of the meeting the shareholder objects to the holding of the meeting. It also constitutes a waiver of the propriety of a discussion of a
particular matter unless the shareholder objects to the matter
54. For cases illustrating the ability of a majority shareholder to defeat a quorum and
thus prevent a meeting from being held, see Hall v. Hall, 506 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1974);
Gearing v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1962).
55. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-657, requires that notice of certain proposed
corporate action, such as amendments to the articles, mergers, share exchanges, sales of
corporate assets other than in the ordinary course of business, and dissolutions, be given to
nonvoting shares. If any of these actions are to be taken by unanimous written consent,
notice must be given to the nonvoting shares at least 10 days before the action is taken; and
the written consents must state that such notice was given.
56. Under REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-658, notice must be given not less than
10 nor more than 60 days before the meeting. However, if the meeting is to consider significant corporate transactions, including amendments to the articles of incorporation, mergers,
share exchanges, sales of assets, or dissolutions, notice must be given not less than 25 nor
more than 60 days before the meeting.
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when it is presented.
Certain fundamental corporate transactions, such as amendments to the articles of incorporation, mergers, share exchanges,
sales of assets other than in the ordinary course of business and
dissolution, require that notice be given to both the voting and
nonvoting shares.57 Although Revised Statute section 13.1-659 does
not explicitly so state, it appears that for a waiver of notice be
effective for those transactions, it must be obtained from all the
shareholders, voting and nonvoting.
Revised Statute section 13.1-660, regarding the record date, is
not significantly different from Old Statute section 13.1-29, except
that the provision for closing the transfer books in lieu of fixing a
record date has not been carried forward. Consequently, a record
date must be fixed. If a record date is not provided for in the bylaws, it may be fixed by the board. It may not, however, be more
than seventy days before the date of the meeting or action requiring the determination of shareholders.
Revised Statute section 13.1-661, regarding the shareholder list
for the meeting, is largely a restatement of Old Statute section
13.1-30. It makes clear, however, a point on which the Old Statute
was silent. Failure to make the list available (as required by section 13.1-661) does not invalidate action taken at the meeting
before a demand for the list is made. But action taken after such a
58
demand is invalid and without effect.
Revised Statute section 13.1-662, regarding the voting entitlement of shares, is comparable to Old Statute section 13.1-32 in articulating who has the right to vote the shares held by interests
such as corporations, fiduciaries, partnerships, executors and joint
tenants. It embraces the general principle that each voting share is
entitled to one vote. It does not, however, answer the question of
whether different voting rights within the same class of shares can
be authorized.5 9
Revised Statute section 13.1-663 is more comprehensive in its ar57. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-658(A).
58. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-30, validated action taken before the demand, but
is silent as to action taken after the demand. Obviously, such action should be invalid; otherwise the provision would have been ineffective.
59. EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 4, § 7.21 official comment, indicates that such a distinction is appropriate, citing the Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Providence & Worchester
Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977). The Official Comment to MODEL ACT, supra note 4, §
7.21, omits any discussion of this point.
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ticulation of the right to vote by proxy than was its predecessor,
Old Statute section 13.1-32. The appointment of the proxy is effective upon receipt by the corporate secretary and is valid for eleven
months, unless a longer term is specified. The death or incapacity
of the shareholder does not affect the right of the proxy holder to
vote, or of the corporation to accept the votes, until notice of the
death or incapacity is received by the secretary of the corporation.
This is a modification of the common law rule that death or incapacity terminates the proxy holder's auhority.60 This modification addresses the needs of the large corporation with numerous
shareholders. The corporation need not inquire into the validity of
the proxy and is entitled to presume the viability of the proxy unless it has notice of the death or incapacity.
The rules for irrevocable proxies are clearly set forth in section
13.1-633. Proxies can be made irrevocable if explicitly so stated in
the proxy and if it is coupled with an interest in the shares. The
statute gives some examples of such an interest, including security
interests and the purchase of the shares. Both of these are property interests. Certain contract interests are also sufficient to support irrevocable proxies, such as when a shareholder is obligated
by the terms of his employment to give an irrevocable proxy or
when the shares are subject to a voting agreement. A transferee of
shares burdened by an irrevocable proxy takes the shares free of
the proxy if he had no knowledge of its irrevocability and if this
feature is not noted on the share certificate.
Revised Statute section 13.1-664 allows, but does not require, a
corporation to establish a procedure by which the beneficial owner
of shares held of record by nominees is recognized by the corporation as the shareholder. This section responds to the desire of a
corporation to communicate readily with the owners of shares held
by brokers in street name. Beneficial holders of shares are included
within the Revised Statute section 13.1-603 definition of "shareholder" if they are recognized as shareholders under this section.
As such, they ought to receive directly from the corporation notices
of meetings, distributions and communications regarding takeover
attempts.
Revised Statute section 13.1-665(B) sets forth the circumstances
under which the corporation, acting in good faith, can accept the
60. See H.

HENN

& J. ALuxANDER,

LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §

196 (3d ed. 1983).
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written vote, consent, waiver or proxy purportedly on behalf of,
but not precisely in the name of, the shareholder. These situations
include action on behalf of a shareholder which is an entity and on
behalf of a fiduciary, trustee or receiver, or agent. The corporation,
if acting in good faith, is entitled to accept written action by these
persons.
Revised Statute section 13.1-665(D), however, allows the corporation to reject any such vote, consent, waiver or proxy if, acting in
good faith, it has reasonable doubt about the validity of the signature or the authority of the agent. Under Revised Statute section
13.1-665(E), the agent of the corporation who either accepts or rejects the vote, consent, waiver or proxy is not liable to the shareholder for the consequences of the failure to accept or reject them
if he acts in good faith and in accordance with this section.
In all instances, the agent may demand reasonable proof of the
validity of the signature or authority. The burden of proving the
invalidity of a vote, consent, waiver or proxy is not placed on the
challenger, as under prior Virginia law. Instead, the corporation's
agent, acting in good faith, may demand satisfactory proof of authority or validity if he has reasonable basis for doubt; otherwise,
he must accept the vote, consent, waiver or proxy.
Revised Statute section 13.1-666 changes prior Virginia law with
respect to quorums. Revised Statute section 13.1-666(A) states
that, unless the articles of incorporation or the statute otherwise
provide, a majority of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter at
the meeting constitutes a quorum. The statute does not authorize
bylaw provisions fixing quorums; nor does it indicate what type of
quorum provisions are authorized in the articles, that is, whether
more-than-majority or less-than-majority provisions are valid.
However, Revised Statute section 13.1-668 states that the articles
may provide for greater quorum or voting requirements than are
stated in the statute. Old Statute section 13.1-31 authorized article
provisions raising the quorum or reducing it to no less than onethird. Since this statute was repealed and replaced by a provision
which explicitly authorizes only provisions increasing the percentage, it appears that less-than-majority quorum provisions are no
longer valid.6 1
61. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-666 and -668, are substantially based on
MODEL AcT, supra note 4, §§ 7.25 and 7.27, respectively. This same ambiguity exists in the
Model Act. The Official Comment to Model Act § 7.25 notes that earlier versions of the
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Revised Statute section 13.1-666(B) provides that once a share is
present for any purpose, including, apparently, presence for the
limited purpose of objecting to the propriety of the meeting, it is
present for quorum purposes. And further, once present a share is
deemed present for the remainder of the meeting. This reverses
the holding in Levisa Oil Corp. v. Quigley,6 2 in which the Virginia
Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of the majority shareholder from the meeting frustrated the quorum. Shares present for
quorum purposes are also present for any adjourned session of the
meeting unless a new record date is set for the adjourned session.
This section also changes the number of votes necessary to approve a matter. Revised Statute section 13.1-666(C) provides that,
absent a special provision in the articles or statute, a measure is
passed if the number of votes cast in favor of it exceeds the number cast against it.6 3 Under this procedure, abstentions are of no
effect. Passage merely requires more affirmative than negative
votes. Old Statute section 13.1-31 provided that passage required a
majority of the votes present, not of the votes cast. Hence, abstention worked against passage.
The Revised Statute introduces the notion of "voting groups" as
a convenient term to describe classes or groups of shares having
the same voting rights. As provided in Revised Statute section
13.1-638, the exact voting rights of the various groups of shares
must be expressed in the articles of incorporation. A voting group
is defined as a class or series of shares which, as provided in the
articles or statute, is "entitled to vote and be counted together and
Model Act allowed less-than-majority quorum provisions so long as the quorum was at least
one-third. The Comment states that this one-third restriction was eliminated because it was
unreasonably confining in certain situations. Thus the intent of Model Act § 7.25 is to allow
any supermajority or less-than-majority provision. However, the statutory language does not
so state, and this intent is undercut by Model Act § 7.27 which, like Revised Statute § 13.1668(a), authorizes the articles to require greater quorum or voting provisions than those in
the statute. It does not authorize less-than-majority quorum provisions.
62. 217 Va. 898, 234 S.E.2d 257 (1977). The bylaw provision in Levisa Oil Corp. stated
that a quorum for the transaction of business at any shareholder meeting shall consist of a
majority of the shares. The court focused on the "for transaction of business" language and
held that the quorum must be present when business is transacted. Id. at 901, 234 S.E.2d at
259-60. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-666(B), clearly would change the holding of
that case. It states that once a share is present for any purpose, it is deemed present for the
remainder of that meeting and any adjournment thereof.
63. Very different rules govern shareholder approval of amendments to the articles, mergers or share exchanges, sales of assets, dissolutions, and voting at directors' meetings. See,
e.g., infra pp. 99-102, 117-19, 121-23, 130 for discussion of these provisions.
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collectively on a matter at a meeting of shareholders. 8' 4 Shares traditionally thought of as preferred with separate class voting rights
or, in the closely held corporation context, a class of common
shares having the right to elect a certain number of directors, constitutes a separate voting group under this definition.
Revised Statute sections 13.1-666 and -667 apply the quorum
and voting rules separately to voting groups. Thus, if the matter to
be considered at the meeting requires the approval of more than
one voting group voting separately, the requisite quorum and voting rules must be met separately for each voting group.
The statutory definition of a voting group and precise voting
rights of the shares of a class as set forth in the articles are extremely important in this context. If the articles confer on a class
general voting rights along with the "common" shares, this class
does not constitute a separate voting group since the definition of a
voting group requires that the shares be entitled to vote and be
counted together and collectively. If the articles or the statute do
not state that the shares are to be voted separately, there is only
one voting group, consisting of the "common" shareholders and
this other class. 5 In this example there would be one application
of the quorum and voting rules to the entire group.
Revised Statute section 13.1-669 governs the election of directors. It authorizes cumulative voting for directors if the articles
provide for it. To ensure that all shareholders realize that the election of directors will be by cumulative voting, section 13.1-669(D)
requires that either the notice of meeting or the proxy statement
disclose that the election of directors will be by cumulative voting,
or that a shareholder notify the corporation of his intent to vote
cumulatively.
In the absence of any provision in the articles regarding cumulative voting or other voting matters, the election of directors takes
place as provided in Revised Statute section 13.1-669(A). That section states that directors are elected by a plurality of the votes
cast. Again, it is a plurality of the votes cast, not of those present
at the meeting.
64. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-603 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
65. See MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 7.26 official comment. The general rule is that all
shares have the same rights, except to the extent that the articles create distinctions among
different classes. See Buxbaum, PreferredStock-Law and Draftsmanship,42 CALiF. L. REv.
243 (1954).
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As explained in the Official Comment to Model Act section 7.28,
a plurality means that the individuals with the highest number of
votes cast are elected, even though they may have received less
than a majority of all votes cast. In the typical majority-minority
faction setting, the majority shareholder would elect all of the directors. In this setting, the plurality rule would not yield a different result than the usual majority vote rule. However, if several
shareholder factions each put up a slate, the slate garnering the
most votes would win, even though it received less than a majority
of the votes cast. 8 Under the usual majority vote rule, no slate
would be elected until it received a majority of the votes.
Revised Statute section 13.1-671 authorizes voting agreements
and explicitly exempts them from the voting trust rules. The substance of this section is not new to Virginia law since Old Statute
section 13.1-34 also validated such agreements. However, unlike its
predecessor, section 13.1-671 requires a written agreement. Moreover, section 13.1-663 deems each party to such an agreement to
have a sufficient interest in the shares of the other parties to support irrevocable proxies in the shares of the other parties.6 7 The
section states that voting agreements are specifically enforceable.
This provision is intended to encourage courts to enforce the terms
of the agreement since money damages for violation of the agreement are often not an adequate remedy. 8
Revised Statute section 13.1-672 codifies a set of procedural
66. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-662(B), provides that each share is entitled to
one vote for as many persons as there are directors to be elected. The election could be
among slates proposed to fill all seats or among individuals proposed to fill a seat. If the
election is among individuals nominated to fill a seat, each share will have one vote. If the
election is among competing slates, the statute would appear to again give each share one
vote which would be cast in favor of one of the slates.
67. This provision in REvIsED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-663, means only that there is
a sufficient interest to support irrevocability. It does not mean that a proxy given by one
party to a voting agreement to another party is automatically irrevocable. REvIsED STATUTE,
supra note 1, § 13.1-663(D), states that a proxy is revocable unless it explicitly states that it
is irrevocable and is supported by an interest in the shares. The provision in REvIsED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-663(D)(5), regarding parties to a voting agreement, merely supplies
the latter element, the sufficient interest in the shares.
68. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 7.31 official comment. This provision is intended to encourage courts not to follow the approach in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947). There the court held that the appropriate remedy was to void the votes of the breaching party that were cast in violation of the agreement. Since the Ringling case dealt with cumulative voting for directors, the court's upholding of the election, while refusing to count these votes, frustrated the purpose of the
agreement to the detriment of both the willing and recalcitrant parties.
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rules for derivative suits for the first time6" in Virginia. The Revised Statute substantially follows the Model Act's approach in
this matter, thus bringing to Virginia law some of the refinements
to these procedures which have taken place in recent years.7"
Section 13.1-672 establishes two prerequisites to maintaining a
derivative suit. First, the plaintiff must either have been a shareholder at the time the challenged transaction occurred or have acquired the shares by operation of law from such a shareholder. 7 1
This provision is a statement of the usual "contemporaneous ownership" rule.72 Section 13.1-672 does not require ownership
throughout the pendency of the suit.73 Second, the complaint must
allege with particularity why demand on the board was excused or
that demand to obtain action by the board was made and refused
or ignored. 74 Revised Statute section 13.1-672(B) allows the court
69. Although some of the new provisions may be consistent with prior case law, the Old
Statute contained no provision specifically dealing with this crucial means of enforcing
shareholder rights. For an excellent compendium of resource material regarding derivative
suits, see A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
(Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as DIscussioN DRAFT].
70. The Model Act's provisions governing derivative suits reflect a reappraisal of these
procedures in view of the extensive litigation in this area and major developments in corporate governance generally. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 7.40 official comment. The Revised
Statute thus engrafts onto Virginia law a "state of the art" set of derivative suit procedures.
71. For purposes of this section, a beneficial owner of shares is deemed a shareholder, but
the holder of an option or convertible debenture is not.
72. Some statutes apply the rule at the time of discovery of the wrongful nature of the
transaction. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 12490(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit
15, § 1516 (Purdon 1967); DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 69, § 7.02(a)(1). See generally Harbrecht, The Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25
UCLA L. REV. 1041 (1978).
73. Some cases have held that a shareholder whose shares are canceled as a result of a
merger may not maintain a derivative suit to challenge the transaction, even though he met
the contemporaneous ownership rule. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del.
1984); Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 178 Conn. 263, 422 A.2d 311 (1979); Note, Survival of
Rights of Action After Corporate Merger, 78 MICH. L. REV. 250 (1979). DISCUSSION DRAFT,
supra note 69, § 7.02(a)(2), requires, as one of its criteria, continued ownership unless the
shareholder ceased to be a shareholder through corporate action in which he did not acquiesce. The Revised Statute meets this concern by not requiring continuous ownership.
74. This requirement follows the general approach of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. One of the
exasperating questions in derivative suit litigation is when demand would be futile. The
comment and reporter's note to DIscussIoN DRAFT, supra note 69, § 7.03, contain an extremely helpful exposition of the law on this point. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814
(Del. 1984), holds that demand is excused when there is reasonable doubt that the business
judgment rule would validate the transaction. Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982), would excuse demand when the complaint permits the inference that the directors lack the requisite disinterest to determine fairly whether the corporate claim should be pursued. See generally Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative
Suits Against Directors on Business Judgment Grounds:From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus.
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to stay the proceeding if the corporation commences an investigation of the charges made in the demand.
Section 13.1-672 does not import into Virginia law the security
for expenses prerequisite to the derivative suit which had in the
past been common elsewhere. 75 This requirement was thought to
discriminate against small shareholders.
Once commenced, a derivative suit cannot be discontinued or
settled without the court's approval. If the court determines that
discontinuance or settlement will substantially affect the shareholders, the court shall direct that notice be sent to the
76
shareholders.
The statute, like Model Act section 7.40 on which it is based,
takes no position on the troublesome question of what weight
should be accorded the judgment of the board, or a special litigation committee of the board, that the suit ought to be dismissed as
contrary to the best interest of the corporation. 77 By one approach,
the court is free to inquire into the good faith and independence of
the decision maker; but assuming these, it will accept the recommendation and dismiss the suit.7 8 By another approach, the business judgment rule is operative. The court would be free to determine, in addition to good faith and independence, whether there is
a rational basis for the decision that the suits ought to be disLAW. 1503 (1984); Payson, Dismissal of Derivative Actions: The Debate, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L.

522 (1981).
In Mount v. Radford Trust Co., 93 Va. 427, 25 S.E. 244 (1896), the court noted that
before a shareholder may maintain a derivative suit, he must demonstrate that demand was
made and refused, or he must allege that the defendants constitute a majority of the board
"or that they or a majority of them are under the control of the defendant wrongdoers, so
that the court may infer that they would refuse to bring such suit." Id. at 430, 25 S.E. at
245.
REVSED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-672, does not require a demand on the shareholders. FED. R Civ. P. 23.1 requires such a demand "if necessary." The Model Act does not
contain this requirement, and it appears to have been rejected in other recent statutes and
cases. See DIscussIoN DRAFT, supra note 69, § 7.03 reporter's note 7.
75. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c)-(f) (West 1977 & Cur. Supp. 1985); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Cur. Supp. 1984).

76. The statute does not state which party shall bear the cost of this notice, but leaves
the matter to the court's discretion. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 7.40 official comment § 1(j),
notes that the Model Act, on which the Revised Statute is based, is unlike some state statutes that impose the cost of notice on a particular party.
77. See generally Brown, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Special Litigation
Committee, 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 601 (1982); Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate
ShareholderLitigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96 (1980).
78. See Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629 (Ala. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett,
47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
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missed.7 9 Finally, in several recent cases, courts have declined to
recognize the decisions of special litigation committees and have
determined for themselves whether dismissal is in the best interest
of the parties.8 0 In one case involving a Virginia corporation,
Abella v. UniversalLeaf Tobacco Co.," l the court determined that,
in addition to reviewing the board's or committee's conclusion, it
must make its own business judgment of whether maintenance of
the suit was in the corporation's interest.
Revised Statute section 13.1-672(D), which has no Model Act
analog, seems to encourage an active involvement by the court in
this determination along the lines of the Abella case. Section 13.1672(D) authorizes the court to appoint a committee of disinterested directors or other persons to determine whether it is in the
corporation's best interest to pursue a particular right or remedy.
This committee is to report its findings to the court, which shall
consider the report and any other relevant evidence and make the
final determination as to whether the proceeding ought to be discontinued. 2 Presumably the conclusion of the board or a special
litigation committee could, but need not necessarily, be considered
by the court as part of the other relevant evidence.
H. Article Nine-Directors and Officers"3
Article Nine deals with the election and responsibility of directors and officers.
Revised Statute section 13.1-673 states the currently accepted
charge to the directors that "[a]l corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of
the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors. 8' 4 This formulation recognizes that the board does not always
manage, but that it does retain ultimate responsibility for management by the officers and employees. It also recognizes the differing
79. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981); Block & Prussin,
supra note 74; Comment, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado: Restricting the Power of Special
Litigation Committees to Terminate Derivative Suits, 68 VA. L. REV. 1197 (1982).
80. See, e.g., Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983);
Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 324 S.E.2d 878 (1985).
81. 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982).
82. Cf. Miller, 336 N.W.2d 709 (adopting a comparable procedure).
83. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-673 to -695.
84. Id. § 13.1-673(B).
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roles of the board in large and small corporations.8 5
Revised Statute section 3.1-673(A) states that all corporations
shall have a board of directors. It does not authorize, as does
Model Act section 8.01(c), closely held corporations to dispense
with the board and describe in the articles of incorporation who
will perform the functions of the board."' The Revised Statute requires a board for all corporations, but it allows provisions in the
articles limiting the role of the directors.
Revised Statute section 13.1-675 clarifies prior law regarding the
fixing and changing of the number of directors. The number of directors is to be fixed by the bylaws or, if there is no provision in
the bylaws, by the articles. Because Revised Statute subsections
13.1-675(A) and (B) specifically deal with amendment to bylaw
provisions regarding the size of the board, they ought to prevail
over Revised Statute section 13.1-714, which deals with amendments to the bylaws generally.
Pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1-675(B), the shareholders may adopt a bylaw fixing the number of directors and stating
that the bylaw cannot be amended by the board of directors. If
there is no such prohibition, the board may amend the bylaw to
increase or decrease the number of directors, but by no more than
thirty percent.
Revised Statute section 13.1-675(E) provides that no one can be
elected a director without his prior consent. Although a person
elected without prior consent could attempt to resign, probably the
better argument is that he was never validly elected to the board.
Revised Statute section 13.1-676 recognizes that the articles of
incorporation may provide for the election of a certain number of
directors by specified classes of shares. Any class having this right
is a separate voting group for purposes of the election and removal
of directors.
Revised Statute section 13.1-677, regarding the terms of office of
directors, is consistent with prior Virginia law, except that the
term of a director elected by the board to fill a vacancy now runs
only until the next election of directors by the shareholders. Previously such a director would serve the remainder of his predeces85. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 8.01 official comment, at 193.
86. The Model Act's approach is found in the corporation codes of states having optional
closely held corporation chapters. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
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sor's term.
Revised Statute section 13.1-679 explicitly provides for resignation by a director. Resignation is effective upon delivery of a written notice of resignation to the corporation unless the notice specifies a later effective date.
Revised Statute section 13.1-680 provides for the removal of directors. This section allows removal of directors by the shareholders with or without cause unless the articles of incorporation specifically state that directors may be removed only for cause. This
latter point seems to be a change from the Old Statute. Old Statute section 13.1-42 provided that a director could be removed with
or without cause; it did not sanction a provision in the articles providing for removal only for cause.
The Revised Statute thus clearly makes available a defensive
anti-takeover amendment. The articles could be amended to provide that directors can be removed only for cause. Such an amendment would mean that an acquiring party could not take immediate control of the board by removing the incumbents and replacing
them with individuals of his choice. This amendment would be a
deterrent only until the next annual meeting unless coupled with
an articles provision for staggered terms for directors, as allowed
by Revised Statute section 13.1-678.
Removal can take place only at a meeting called for that purpose, and notice of the meeting must state that removal is the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the meeting.8 7 Removal can take
place at either the annual or a special meeting. Notice of purpose
generally need not be given for the annual meeting; 88 however, if
one of the purposes is to vote on removal of a director, notice of
this purpose must be given.
The list in Revised Statute section 13.1-654 of who may demand
a special meeting is critical in this instance. For the over-thirtyfive-shareholder corporation, only the board, its chairman or the
president can demand a special meeting unless the articles list additional persons. 89 For the thirty-five-or-fewer-shareholder corporation, those same persons or the holders of twenty percent of the
87. REVISE STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-680(D).
88. Id. § 13.1-658(B) states that, unless the articles otherwise provide, notice of purpose
for the annual meeting need not be given. Section 13.1-658(C) requires that the notice of a
special meeting state the purpose of the meeting.
89. Id. § 13.1-655(A)(1).
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shares entitled to vote may demand a meeting.90 Hence in the
over-thirty-five-shareholder corporation having no special article
provision, it is unlikely that removal could take place at a special
meeting since the persons authorized to call the meeting may be
sympathetic to the individual whose removal is sought. However,
removal could take place at the annual meeting. Since the shareholders have the right to remove directors, they could demand that
this be included on the agenda for and notice of the meeting. Of
course, removal at the annual meeting would only be an issue if the
terms of the board are staggered.
If a director is elected by a separate voting group, only that voting group may participate in the vote to remove him.91 At the
meeting called for removal, unless the corporation employs cumulative voting or unless the articles require a greater percentage, the
director is removed only if the votes in favor of removal are a majority of the votes entitled to vote on the motion.92 This is a different voting rule than applies elsewhere in the statute, and it is analogous to the rule governing shareholder approval of significant
corporate transactions.93 Generally, matters are approved at the
shareholders' meetings by a majority of the votes cast; election of
directors is by a plurality of votes cast. Yet, removal requires a
larger number of votes: a majority of the votes entitled to be cast.
Revised Statute section 13.1-682 provides for the filling of vacancies on the board, including vacancies arising from an increase in
the size of the board. Both the shareholders and the remaining directors, even if they are less than a quorum, may fill vacancies.The
statute thus provides the maximum opportunity to maintain full
board membership at little harm to any group. If the shareholders
disapprove of the person selected by the board, they can remove
him, assuming they can demand that a meeting be called to consider removal.
Revised Statute section 13.1-684 provides that the board may
permit any member to participate in the meeting by any means of
communication allowing all members participating to simultaneously hear each other. A member participating in the meeting pur90. Id. § 13.1-655(A)(2).

91. Id. § 13.1-680(B).
92. Id. § 13.1-680(C).
93. See, e.g., infra pp. 117-19, 121-23, 130 for discussion of shareholder voting on amendments to the articles of incorporation, plans of merger or share exchange, sales of all or

substantially all the assets other than in the ordinary course of business, and dissolutions.
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suant to this section is deemed to be present at the meeting,
whether or not physically present.
The difference between this section and Old Statute section
13.1-41 is that the Old Statute seemed to allow such participation
at the option of the director. Revised Statute section 13.1-684, on
the other hand, provides that "the board.

. .

may permit" a mem-

ber to participate by conference call. It thus appears that the
board, presumably by a majority, has the right to decide if a member can participate by conference call. The possibility exists that a
majority of the board could determine that a director not physically present at the meeting site may not so participate. The Official Comment to Model Act section 8.20 states that the directors'
judgment on this matter is discretionary. It is possible then for one
faction to eliminate opposition by deciding that only those physically present may participate in the meeting.
Revised Statute section 13.1-685 allows the board of directors to
act by unanimous written consent. Action of the board taken in
this manner is deemed to be the action of the board as of the date
the last director signs the consent, unless the consents specify a
different date. Although action by written consent requires unanimity, the consent forms could provide, for example, that the consents constitute action of the board as of the date on which a majority of the board has signed.
The Official Comment to Model Act section 8.21, on which this
section is based, describes the usefulness of written consents. It
notes that for publicly held corporations consents are .especially
useful when matters require prompt action and are non-controversial. From this statement, an inference ought not be drawn that
good corporate practice requires that significant corporate matters
not be acted on by unanimous consent, but only at a meeting. The
theory of the unanimous consent is that if all the directors are of a
like mind, a meeting is not necessary.94
Revised Statute section 13.1-687 governs waiver of notice of a
meeting. It allows a director to waive notice either before or after
the meeting. Waiver is effected either in writing or by the director's attendance at, or participation in, the meeting. The director
does not waive notice by attendance or participation if, at the be94. There may be little consequence to the comment's distinction between controversial
and non-controversial matters, however. In reality, if the matter is controversial it is likely
that a meeting will be necessary because unanimous consent will not be obtainable.
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ginning of the meeting or upon his arrival, he objects to holding
the meeting or transacting business at it and does not thereafter
vote for or assent to action taken at the meeting.9
It seems clear from this language that, in order to preserve this
objection, the director need not leave the meeting after stating his
objection. It is less clear whether the objection is preserved if the
director participates in discussion. The question involves the
meaning of "participation." Are voting for or assenting to 96 action
the only things destroying the objection? Or is stating a position
on the issue before the meeting deemed participation? By common
understanding, the latter is deemed participation.
The Official Comment to the Model Act states that notice of a
meeting is a technical requirement and waivers should be permitted freely. 97 This statement supports the argument that participation short of voting or assenting would constitute a waiver. The
Official Comment states that one who attends did in fact have notice and generally should not be able to raise a technical objection
to lack of proper notice. It concedes, however, that in some situations lack of notice can result in actual prejudice, as for instance if
certain key directors are not present. In these situations, the objecting director must follow the procedures set forth in the statute. 98 The Model Act seems to add a gloss of "actual prejudice" to
the statutory language. A director not receiving the requisite notice
ought to be free, for whatever tactical reason, to object and ought
not be required to demonstrate "actual prejudice."
Revised Statute section 13.1-688 establishes the quorum and
voting rules for directors' meetings. A majority of the number of
directors, as fixed in the articles or bylaws, is necessary to establish
a quorum. The articles or bylaws may reduce this percentage, for
quorum purposes, to as low as one-third. Different rules apply to
shareholders' meetings. 99
Revised Statute section 13.1-688(C) states the voting rules for
95. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-687(B).
96. Id. § 13.1-688(D) states that a director present at a meeting is deemed to have assented to the action unless he objects, votes against it, or abstains.
97. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 8.23 official comment.
98. Id.
99. In contrast, REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-668(A), authorizes supermajority
quorum provisions for shareholders' meetings only if they are contained in the articles. A
bylaw provision is not valid. It also allows a greater-than-majority, but not a less-than-majority, quorum provision.
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directors' meetings, which differ in two significant aspects from
those governing shareholders' meetings. First, consistent with
Levisa Oil Corp. v. Quigley,0 0 the quorum must be present whenever a vote is taken. 0 1 The presence of a quorum at the outset of
the meeting is not sufficient. Second, approval requires a majority,
or such higher percentage as the articles or bylaws 0 2 require, of
the votes present, not of the votes cast, as is the case at shareholders' meetings.
Under a provision in Revised Statute section 13.1-688(E), approval by the board is unnecessary for certain major corporate
transactions if they have been unanimously approved by the
shareholders.
In a separate subsection, Revised Statute section 13.1-688(D)
states the circumstances in which a director is deemed to have assented to board action. A director present at a meeting is deemed
to have assented to action at a meeting unless he: (1) objects to the
holding of the meeting or to the transacting of certain business; (2)
votes against it; or (3) abstains from voting on the matter. As
stated in the voting provision of Revised Statute section 13.1688(C), abstaining works against passage since passage requires a
majority of the votes present. It is therefore appropriate that voting against or abstaining be treated the same for "assenting"
purposes.
In contrast, Old Statute section 13.1-44 provided that a director
was deemed to have assented unless his dissent was entered in the
record of the meeting or a written dissent was filed before or
within three days after adjournment of the meeting. Abstention
without filing a written dissent was deemed assent. 103 Under the
Revised Statute, assent seems to be devoid of any separate meaning and is the same as voting in favor of board action. If a director
is present at a meeting and does not object to the meeting or trans100. 217 Va. 898, 234 S.E.2d 257 (1977).
101. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-688(C).
102. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-39, authorized only articles of incorporation provisions increasing the required percentage for board action.
103. Under the Old Statute, abstaining worked against passage. However, abstaining
without filing a dissent constituted assent for which a director would be deemed
accountable.
MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 8.24(d), is similar to OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-44. A
director present at a meeting is deemed to have assented unless he: (1) objects to the meeting or the transaction of specific business at it; (2) dissents or abstains, and this fact is
entered in the minutes; or (3) delivers a written dissent before or after adjournment.
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acting of specific business, or votes against it or abstains, what else
can he have done but voted in favor?
The Revised Statute thus seems to afford the directors greater
protection from liability than the Old Statute did, even though the
liability sections are comparable. For example, both Revised Statute section 13.1-692 and Old Statute section 13.1-44 impose liability on directors voting in favor of, or assenting to, an illegal distribution. Under the Old Statute, a director who simply abstained
would be liable; he would not be liable under the Revised Statute.
Moreover, under the Old Statute, the identity of those not liable
could readily be determined. The procedure set out in Old Statute
section 13.1-44 required a notice of dissent to be recorded in the
minutes or filed separately. In either event, the identity of the dissenting director would be disclosed. The Revised Statute is less
specific on this point. Since it does not require written dissents, in
some circumstances it may be difficult, after the fact, to determine
10 4
who is liable.
Revised Statute section 13.1-689 allows the board to create various committees, unless otherwise provided in the articles or bylaws. Such committees are created by the approval of the greater
of a majority of the directors then in office or of the number of
directors required by the articles or bylaws to take action under
Revised Statute section 13.1-688.101 The board may create the
104. For example, assume seven directors are present at a meeting and a measure is
passed, four votes in favor and two opposed. If the minutes simply reflect the vote, four to
two, there is no way to know which three directors are not liable. The Old Statute placed
the onus on the director wishing to avoid liability. The Revised Statute imposes no such
burden. This is especially a problem since the burden of proof in suits alleging breach of the
standard of care is on the plaintiff, not on the director.
105. Section 13.1-688 allows supermajority provisions. RVISED STATUE, supra note 1, §
13.1-689, is taken from MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 8.25(b). The Official Comment to §
8.25(b) explains that it is intended as a supermajority provision and underscores the importance of the decision to create committees and empower them to act on behalf of the board.
The comment states that the committees are created by "the affirmative vote of a majority
of the board of directors then in office, or, if greater, by the number of directors required to
take action by the articles of incorporation or bylaws." This is apparently a reference to a
supermajority provision in the articles or the bylaws.
As drafted, however, REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-689(B), is unclear. The articles may state what percentage of the board is required for quorum or voting purposes. Use
of the word "number" of directors rather than "percentage" is confusing. There is no way to
know how many votes are required for a majority, or a supermajority, unless the number
present at the meeting is also known. One interpretation of the provision is that the approval of the committee requires the vote of the greater of: (1) a majority of the directors in
office; or (2) a supermajority, if the articles or bylaws have a supermajority provision. While
this interpretation clarifies the provision, it makes it unnecessary because it merely restates
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committees; but their role and responsibilities, subject to the constraints of this section, are defined by the articles or bylaws.
These committees are committees of the board. As such, they
discharge the responsibilities of the board as stated in Revised
Statute section 13.1-673. The conduct of a director serving on a
committee is governed by the same standards that apply to board
members generally. In no event, however, may a committee approve or recommend to the shareholders for their approval certain
significant corporate actions including filling vacancies on the
board, adopting amendments to the articles or bylaws, authorizing
certain distributions or issuance of shares, or approving mergers. 108
Revised Statute section 13.1-690 states the general standard of
conduct to which directors will be held in the discharge of their
responsibilities. Since the Old Statute contains no comparable provision, this section imports new statutory material into Virginia
law.
The issue of the appropriate standard of conduct for directors
has been the subject of intense interest in recent years and has
evoked a plethora of scholarly writing. 10 7 The Model Act has been
concerned with the topic for quite some time, and the American
Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance Project has recently dealt with the issue. 1°8
Given this national concern and the fact that the Revised Statute has generally closely followed the Model Act, it is extremely
the usual rule. A provision in the articles establishing a supermajority would prevail over
the statutory majority voting rule.
106. RFVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-689(D).
107. See, e.g., Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93
(1979); Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-SameHarbor But Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947 (1980); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of CorporateMisconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099
(1977); Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: the Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 609 (1984);
Kennedy, The Standard of Responsibility for Directors, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 624 (1984);
Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director'sDuty of Attention: Time for
Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1984); Manning, The Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 615 (1984); Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1979); Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-SafeHarboror
UnchartedReef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Comparedwith Delaware
Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919 (1980).
108. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984 & Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) [hereinafter cited, respectively, as TENT.
DRAFT No. 3 and TENT. DRAFT No. 4].
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significant that the Revised Statute departs radically from the
Model Act on this fundamental point. Moreover, the Revised Statute is significantly different from prior Virginia law.10 9
As stated in Revised Statute section 13.1-690(A), "[a] director
shall discharge his duties as a direbtor, including his duties as a
member of a committee, in accordance with his good faith business
judgment of the best interests of the corporation."
In contrast Model Act section 8.30(a) provides that:
[a] director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his
duties as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation.
Generally speaking, the Model Act adopts a tort-like reasonable
man standard comprising numerous elements. The director must
act: (1) in good faith, (2) with the care of an ordinarily prudent
person (3) in a like position (4) under similar circumstances. 110 Application of this standard requires the trier of fact
first to construct a factual background including the time and information constraints, the makeup of the board, and its role in corporate decision making (the "in like position" and "in similar circumstances" elements). Next, what the ordinarily prudent person,
as measured against that factual background, would do with respect to the issue in question must be determined. Finally, the
trier of fact must decide if the conduct or action of the directors in
question was consistent with the reasonable man standard.
Because of the numerous variables and the real, but difficult to
quantify or articulate, pressures that existed at the time the judgment in question was made, the Model Act standard is difficult to
construct and apply. These difficulties may result in its not being
109. See infra notes 112 & 118 and accompanying text.
110. For a discussion of the components of the Model Act standard, see A.B.A. Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, CorporateDirector's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1600-04 (1978) in addition to the MODEL AcT, supra
note 4, § 8.30 official comment.
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rigorously used by the courts. Consequently, there is uncertainty as
to its meaning and viability. It may be hard for directors subject to
the standard to take it seriously if they cannot understand it or do
not believe it will be employed. If rigorously applied, it could be
criticized for holding directors to an unrealistically high
standard.""'
Prior Virginia case law was more compatible with the general
approach of the Model Act. Directors were required to exercise
"the same degree of care . . . that men prompted by self-interest
generally exercise in their own affairs. 11 12 While these cases did not
require the construction of the elaborate framework called for by
the Model Act, they did require the trier of fact to measure the
conduct in question against an external standard of care.
In contrast, the standard articulated in Revised Statute section
13.1-690(A) comprises only two elements. The director must discharge his responsibilities in accordance with (1) his good faith (2)
business judgment of the best interests of the corporation. This
standard has the appeal of apparent simplicity.
It may be a unique statute nationally. This fact, coupled with
the lack of legislative history, may mean that it will be difficult for
courts to define its elements and parameters. Some preliminary observations may be useful in this regard. 3
111. See CODE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, app. 4 at 248.
TENT. DRAFT No.4, supra note 108, sets forth a standard of care very similar to the Model

Act, but it protects business decisions separately under the less rigorous business judgment
rule, if they are made on an informed basis. This model establishes the reasonable man
standard for conduct generally. Actual business decisions are not reviewed against that standard, but rather against the more lenient business judgment rule.
For a discussion of the earlier, but not substantively different, A.L.I. version of the standard of care contained in TENT. DRAFT No. 3, supra note 108, see generally Frankel, Corporate Directors'Duty of Care: The American Law Institute's Project on Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 705 (1984); Hinsey, supra note 107, at 609; Kennedy, supra
note 107, at 624; Phillips, Principlesof Corporate Governance: A Critique of PartIV, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653 (1984).
112. Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 17, 171 S.E. 501, 506 (1933) (quoting Hun v. Cary, 82
N.Y. 65, 71 (1880)). The same test was applied in O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors Corp.,
163 Va. 908, 920, 177 S.E. 852, 857 (1935). These cases involved failed banks and financial
institutions. The directors were found liable for not acting as prudent bank or financial
institution directors. See also Marshall v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Sav.'s Bank, 85 Va. 676, 8
S.E. 586 (1889). In Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982),
the court examined the conduct and the conclusion of a special litigation committee and
found that the committee had acted reasonably and that there was a reasonable basis for its
conclusion.
113. See also CODE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, app. 4, at 248-50.
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The statute presents two separate, but related, issues. The first
raises the question whether the statute articulates a standard to
which directors will be held in the performance of their duties. The
second involves the substantive content of that standard.
It is important to recognize that the statute does purport to
state a standard of conduct to which directors will be held in discharging their duties. The statute is not merely a codification of
the business judgment rule. 11 4 The business judgment rule protects
directors from liability for decisions made;" 5 it does not, however,
directly establish a standard by which directors are to guide their
future conduct." 6 In the section heading, "[g]eneral standards of
conduct for directors," and in the introductory phrase, "a director
shall discharge his duties," Revised Statute Section 13.1-690(A)
clearly states a standard against which the conduct of the directors
17
is to be measured.
As a standard, the section applies to directors in discharging
their duties generally and in making specific decisions or taking
actions. It thus applies to passive misconduct and inattention to
duties, as well as to actual misconduct. 18
114. The business judgment rule is most often applied as a presumption in favor of directors, rather than as an affirmative standard of conduct. See Arsht, supra note 107, at 13031. In showing that a defendant director made a decision, plaintiff establishes the fact from
which the presumption is drawn. The presumption raises the business judgment rule as a
defense, and the burden shifts to plaintiff to negate it. The court does not attempt to decide
whether it agrees with the directors; it determines only whether there is a rational basis for
the decision. Id. at 126.
115. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Casey v. Woodruff, Misc. 2d _, 49
N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Arsht, supra note 107; Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and ShareholderDerivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27 (1981).
116. Indirectly, it certainly does provide a standard. If the directors understand that a
court will uphold those decisions supported by a rational basis, they will realize the need to
act rationally in the future. Recently, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985),
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the action of directors in approving a merger was not
entitled to protection under the business judgment rule since it was not an informed decision. In order for the decision to be an informed one, the directors would have had to inform
themselves, before acting, of all information reasonably available. Id. at 872; see TENT.
DRAT No. 4, supra note 108, § 4.01(c)(2).
117. Use of the phrase "business judgment" in the statutory language ought not tempt
courts to conclude that § 13.1-690(A) is merely a codification of the business judgment rule,
rather than of a standard of conduct. This introductory language is the same as that in the
Model Act. The Official Comment to MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 8.30, explains that this
section provides the standard which directors must meet in discharging their
responsibilities.
118. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981) (applying the
Model Act standard to passive conduct).
The Virginia Supreme Court opinions in O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors Corp., 163 Va.
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The next question presented is: precisely what is the substantive
content of this standard applicable to both actual and passive misconduct? The section may present some difficulty regarding this
question. In an effort to avoid the complication and artificiality of
the Model Act, the section sets forth a very straightforward standard. The section is intended to afford directors very broad latitude in the discharge of their duties.1 19
There is a risk, however, that in so doing, the standard has been
substantially diluted. In an effort to avoid measuring the conduct
or decision in question against any outside or objective standard,
the drafters did not include the words "reasonable" or "rational
basis" in the statute. The trier of fact need only find good faith
and determine whether the conduct in question was a product of
the director's own business judgment of what is in the best interest
of the corporation. The director's conduct or decision is not to be
analyzed in the context of whether a reasonable man would have
acted similarly.
As so applied, the standard may be reduced to a purely subjective inquiry into the director's conduct. If the trier of fact does not
measure the conduct in question against some external standard, it
must determine, in hindsight, whether the conduct comported with
what the trier of fact believes was the director's good faith business
judgment of the best interest of the corporation. This application
may encourage directors to take risks necessary to develop the corporation's business without undue concern for liability and may be
a true advantage of the statute.
The statute, however, may also protect the utterly inept, but
well-meaning, good faith director. 120 In support of the statute, it
could be argued that, since the shareholders ultimately own the
enterprise and elect the directors, there is no need to impose a
high statutory standard of care on the directors. If some directors
are well-intentioned but marginal, it is the shareholders' responsibility. They could elect better individuals or replace the inept.
908, 177 S.E. 852 (1935), and Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 171 S.E. 501 (1933), held the
directors liable for inattention to their duties. Applying REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §
13.1-690, to inattention or passive misconduct would therefore be consistent with prior case
law.
119. See Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director'sDuty of Attention:
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1984).
120. TENT. DRAFT No. 4, supra note 108, § 4.01 comment f, describes a good faith standard as one providing too much protection for the directors and officers. It would insulate
the decision makers from liability for the consequences of objectively irrational conduct.
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This argument ignores several realities. First, it is the majority, or

plurality, of the shareholders which elects the directors. Those
elected are charged with acting in the best interest of the entity
and of all the shareholders, not only of those who elected them.
Second, in the large, publicly held corporation, the board, or perhaps more frequently the dominant executive officers, nominate
the directors. And their choices are typically ratified overwhelmingly by the shareholders through the proxy process.
In considering whether the statute does protect the inept but
well-meaning director, one might consider that rational conduct is
an element assumed within the standard. The statute requires a
director to act in what he believes to be the best interests of the
corporation. The corporation exists as an entity to serve some purpose or achieve some objective or advantage for the shareholders.
It is difficult to demonstrate that irrational acts are in the best
interest of the entity or are of any advantage to the entity in
achieving its purpose. One might thus conclude that only a director's rational acts are protected.12 '
The remaining sections of Revised Statute section 13.1-690 follow the Model Act fairly closely. In performing his functions, a director is entitled by section 13.1-690(B) to rely on information,
opinions or reports, including financial information and data prepared by officers, employees, board committees or outside experts,
so long as the director in good faith believes the individuals to be
competent. This reliance provision is qualified by the clause
"[u]nless [the director] has knowledge or information concerning
' 22
the matter . . . that makes reliance unwarranted.' 1
If the action taken by the director would in fact violate the standard of care, but the director acted in reliance on others and had
no reason to doubt the competence of the individual relied upon,
he will not be liable. However, one possessing knowledge or information123 suggesting that the conclusion or opinion of the expert is
121. Admittedly, this argument ignores the fact that the statute inquires only into the
director's own assessment of what is in the corporation's best interest. A director who honestly believes that an utterly stupid, irrational act is in the corporation's best interest would
be protected under a literal reading of the statute. The difficulty a trier of fact would have
in exonerating such conduct may provide the impetus to adopt an interpretation of the
statute allowing inquiry at least into the rationality of the belief, either on the ground suggested or as bearing on the director's good faith.

122. REVISED

STATUTE,

supra note 1, § 13.1-690(B).

123. Inclusion of this "or information" language means that if a director has available
information about the matter which would cause reliance to be unwarranted, the defense is
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unfounded may not avail himself of the reliance defense.
Revised Statute section 13.1-690(C) states that a director is not
liable for action taken as a director, or for failure to act, if he performed his duties in conformance with this section. This provision
establishes the pervasiveness of the standard: the standard is coextensive with the directors' duties as defined in the statute, other
law or the articles. Once the director proves that he has met the
standard, he is exonerated. The business judgment rule is not to be
applied separately as grounds on which to review the conduct.
This provision probably is not intended to insulate directors
from liability based on theories or causes of action other than the
standard of care. For example, if a director voted in favor of a
measure which substantially and inordinately benefited him personally, compliance with the standard of care probably
would not
24
preclude a suit based on breach of fiduciary duty.
Revised Statute section 13.1-691 deals with director conflicts. Although it does not change the thrust of prior Virginia law, it does
amplify prior law by some extremely helpful definitional and procedural provisions. Moreover, it narrows the ambit of the conflict
of interest rules. Old Statute section 13.1-39.1 applied to both directors and officers; Revised Statute section 13.1-691 applies only
to directors. Under the Revised Statute, a transaction in which a
director has a direct or indirect personal interest is not voidable
merely because of such interest if any one of the following circumstances exists: (1) the material facts surrounding the transaction
are disclosed, and the transaction is approved or ratified by either
the board or the shareholders; or (2) the transaction is fair to the
corporation.
Revised Statute section 13.1-691(B) defines an indirect interest
to include material financial interests in an entity which is a party
to the transaction, or service on the board as an officer or trustee
of the entity which is a party to the transaction, if the transaction
has been, or ought to have been, approved by the board of the
entity.
Revised Statute sections 13.1-691(C) and (D) set forth special
voting procedures for board or shareholder approval of conflict of
unavailable even though the director had no actual knowledge. The director is required to
act on the information he possesses.
124. It probably should not, if for no other reason than that the burdens of proof are
completely different in these two causes of action.
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interest transactions. These procedures essentially require approval by a majority of those having no direct or indirect interest
in the transaction.

Old Statute section 13.1-39.1 provided that approval by the
board or shareholders required passage by the requisite majority
without counting the votes of the interested director. Revised Statute subsections 13.1-691(C) and (D) are in one sense more liberal

and in another more rigorous than the Old Statute. They require
approval only by a majority of the disinterested votes, even if this
number is less than a majority of all the votes. However, the approval must be by a majority of all the disinterested votes, not

merely by the majority at a meeting at which a quorum is present.
Several additional points regarding section 13.1-691 should be

noted. First, this section merely provides that transactions meeting
one of the validation tests are not voidable. The section does not
mean that such transactions cannot be challenged on other
grounds, including breach of fiduciary duty by the director involved or breach of the standard of care by the directors in approving it.
Second, an uncertainty existing under prior versions of this type
of provision has not been clarified by this section, nor by Model
Act section 8.31 on which it is based. For example, if a transaction
is approved by the directors in compliance with this section, may it
nonetheless be voidable if it is manifestly unfair to the corporation? If the section is read literally, the answer is no. If any one of
the three alternative means of validation is met, the transaction is
not voidable. Fairness to the corporation is a separate test of validation; it is not an element in the alternatives providing for approval by either the directors or shareholders.
Some courts have read the fairness element into those alternatives. 125 As drafted, section 13.1-691 renders an unfair transaction
approved by the board binding on the corporation. However, the
corporation in turn may have recourse against the director benefiting from the transaction on breach of fiduciary duty grounds and
perhaps against the entire board on standard of care or corporate
waste grounds.
Finally, this section states nothing about the burden of proof.
125. See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405,
241 P.2d 66, 74-75 (1952).
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Old Statute section 13.1-39.1, like prior versions of the Model
Act, 126 stated those instances where the common law rule that con-

flict of interest transactions were automatically void, or voidable at
the option of the corporation, would not apply. The presumption
was in favor of voidability, especially where the issue involved the
fairness of the transaction. The burden of proving that the contract was binding on the corporation fell on the party seeking to
uphold it, the interested director.
The approach of the Old Statute was consistent with the corporate law principle that the corporate fiduciary bears the burden of
proving compliance with his duties. While section 13.1-691 is silent
on the burden of proof issue, there is no reason to believe that
a
1 27
change in the common law burden of proof rule is intended.
Revised Statute section 13.1-692 imposes personal liability on directors voting for or assenting to distributions made in violation of
the statute unless the director complies with the standard of care
set forth in Revised Statute section 13.1-690. Given the latitude of
the standard of care, and the discretion provided the directors by
Revised Statute section 13.1-653(D) to use financial statements
prepared on various bases in determining allowable distributions,
the liability imposed by this section may be minimal. The reliance
defense is especially important in this setting, given the sophisticated judgments required by the equity solvency test.128 In the ab-

sence of knowledge or information, the directors may rely on the
judgment of others as to the impact of the distribution on the corporation's solvency.
Revised Statute section 13.1-692 is consistent with Old Statute
section 13.1-44 in limiting liability to the illegal amount of the distribution only; and the liability is to the corporation and its creditors. A director found liable is entitled to contribution from all
other directors voting for or assenting to the distribution without
complying with the standard of care and from all shareholders re126. See generally Larson, Corporate Conflicts of Interest under the VirginiaStock Corporation Act, 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 463 (1975) (discussing OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.139.1); Pinto & Bulbulia, Statutory Responses to Interested Director Transactions:A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NoTE DAmE LAW. 201 (1977).
127. This statute, which is silent on the point, replaces one explicitly providing for a burden of proof. One could argue, then, that there must have been a legislative intent to change
the burden. However, REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-691, is largely an enactment of
MODEL

AcT, supra note 4, § 8.31; and there is no evidence that the Model Act intended to

change the common law on this point.
128. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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ceiving the distribution.
Model Act section 8.33(b)(2) limits the contribution right against
the shareholders to those knowing that the distribution is made in
violation of the statute. Revised Statute section 13.1-692, like Old
Statute section 13.1-44, makes no such distinction. Accordingly, all
shareholders receiving the distribution are liable in proportion to
the amount they received. 29
Revised Statute section 13.1-692(C) provides a two-year statute
of limitations on suits against directors. The outside time limit on
the shareholders' obligation would be somewhat longer than two
years. Section 13.1-692(C) does not allow the corporation to pursue
the shareholders. The corporation or its creditors may sue the directors to recover the illegal portion of the distribution. The directors, if found liable, may seek contribution from all shareholders
receiving the distribution.
Revised Statute section 13.1-693 requires that every corporation
have at least a president and a secretary, together with such other
officers as are described in the bylaws. The same person may simultaneously hold more than one office, including those of president and secretary.
The section sets forth a statutory responsibility for only one office, that of secretary. He shall have responsibility for preparing
and maintaining custody of the minutes of directors' and shareholders' meetings and for authenticating corporate records. Under
Revised Statute section 13.1-694, other officers shall perform the
duties set forth in the bylaws, or prescribed by the directors consistent with the bylaws or by other officers authorized to do so by
the board.
Revised Statute section 13.1-695 provides for the resignation and
removal of officers. An officer may resign at any time. He may also
be removed at any time, with or without cause, by the board or by
the officer who appointed him. This section does not incorporate
the provision of Model Act section 8.44 which states that removal
does not affect the officers' contract rights. Resolution of removed
officers' contract rights is thus left to contract law.
The Revised Statute does not adopt Model Act section 8.42, the
129. The theory is that all shareholders received something to which they were not entitled. There is, however, the potential for harm to unknowing shareholders who may have
spent the distribution long before they were called upon for contribution.
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standard of conduct for officers. It contains no provision on this
point. Consequently the common law will continue to apply.
I. Article Ten-Indemnification3 0
Article Ten contains the indemnification provisions. Because of
the complexity and integration of these provisions, it is not practical to consider each one separately. It is more feasible to discuss
the right of indemnification generally.
Revised Statute section 13.1-696 contains some helpful definitions to be used in Article Ten. Section 13.1-697 authorizes the
corporation to indemnify an individual serving as a director if certain conditions are met. Section 13.1-698 states instances in which
the corporation must indemnify.
Revised Statute section 13.1-697 provides that an individual,
serving as a director, who is a party to a proceeding 1 ' may be indemnified if he acted in good faith and: (1) if acting in his official
capacity, he believed that his conduct was in the best interest of
the corporation; (2) if not acting in his official capacity, he believed
that his conduct was at least not opposed to the corporation's best
interest; or (3) if in a criminal proceeding, he had at least a reasonable belief that his conduct was not unlawful. A separate standard
is applied to individuals sued as a result of their conduct with respect to an employee benefit plan.
This section prohibits indemnification by the corporation in connection with proceedings brought by, or in the right of, the corporation, where the individual has been found liable to the corporation. Indemnification is also prohibited in suits where the
individual was found to have improperly received a personal benefit. Old Statute section 13.1-3.1, in contrast, narrowly authorized
corporate indemnification for expenses in instances where the director was found liable for negligence or misconduct in performance of his duties if a court found that, liability notwithstanding,
such person was fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification.
Indemnification in these circumstances may be sought under the
court-ordered indemnification provisions of Revised Statute section 13.1-700.
130. RE VISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-696 to -704.

131. A proceeding is broadly defined, id. § 13.1-696, to include threatened, pending or
completed civil, criminal, administrative or investigative action whether formal or informal
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Article Ten provides two types of indemnification, mandatory
and discretionary. Revised Statute section 13.1-698 confers a
mandatory right of indemnification in limited circumstances.
Under section 13.1-698, the corporation must indemnify against
expenses a director who "entirely prevails" in the proceeding. This
section does allow, however, a provision in the articles of incorporation modifying or eliminating the right to indemnification.
The "entirely prevails" language is intended to limit the statutory indemnification right to instances where the proceeding was
concluded without a finding of liability. It thereby avoids the argument that a person who successfully defends some counts, but not
others, is entitled to at least partial indemnification."3 2
Discretionary indemnification is more common than the
mandatory right. In order to obtain discretionary indemnification
pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1-697, two separate judgments must be made. First, a determination must be made that
the individual is entitled to be indemnified. This determination is
made pursuant to either the general determination procedures in
section 13.1-701 or to the separate court-ordered indemnification
procedures of section 13.1-700.
The individual seeking indemnification must demonstrate in this
phase that indemnification is permissible because the criteria of
Revised Statute section 13.1-697 have been met.133 The determination is made in one of several ways: (1) by a majority vote of a
quorum consisting of directors not parties to the proceeding; (2) if
a quorum cannot be obtained, by a majority vote of a special committee consisting of directors not at the time parties to the proceeding; (3) by legal counsel; or (4) by a vote of the shareholders
(not counting the shares owned by or voted under control of direc1 34
tors who are at the time parties to the proceeding).
After the determination that indemnification is permissible, the
authorization of the amount of indemnification must be made, generally by the same body that made the determination. 135 In making
this authorization, it is appropriate for that body to consider, in
addition to the reasonableness of the request, the ability of the
132. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 8.52 official comment; see Merritt-Chapman & Scott
Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
133. REvIsED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-701(A) & (B).
134. Id. § 13.1-701(B).

135. Id.

§ 13.1-701(C).
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corporation to pay the amount requested and whether the corporation's financial resources ought to be devoted to this or some other
purpose. 36
Unless limited by the articles, the individual has the right, under
Revised Statute section 13.1-700, to apply to the court conducting
the proceeding, or to another court having jurisdiction, for indemnification. This right to apply for a judicial determination of indemnification exists in two instances. First, it is a means of enforcing the mandatory right of indemnification conferred by Revised
Statute section 13.1-698. Second, it is the only means by which an
individual found liable to the corporation in a derivative suit may
apply for indemnification. Section 13.1-700 allows a court to determine whether, despite liability, indemnification against expenses
would be reasonable under the circumstances.
Revised Statute section 13.1-699 authorizes a corporation to pay
or reimburse reasonable expenses before final disposition of the
proceeding. In order to be eligible for such an advance, the individual must state in writing his good faith belief that he meets the
criteria for indemnification set forth in Revised Statute section
13.1-697. He must also undertake to repay the advance if it is later
determined that indemnification is not appropriate. 1 37
Officers, employees and agents are entitled by Revised Statute
section 13.1-702 to the same rights of indemnification as directors.
Revised Statute section 13.1-703 authorizes a corporation to
maintain insurance against liability on behalf of its directors, officers, employees and agents. This right is not substantively limited by the statutory indemnification provisions. A corporation
may thus provide insurance coverage broader than the indemnification right.
Revised Statute section 13.1-704(A) states that, unless the articles or bylaws explicitly so provide, any article or bylaw provision
regarding indemnification does not supplant the statutory right.
Moreover, section 13.1-704(B) allows a corporation to confer indemnification rights in addition to, or broader than, those contained in Article Ten by a provision in the articles, in any bylaw
made by the shareholders, or in a resolution of the shareholders.
136. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 8.55 official comment.
137. This undertaking need not be secured, and the corporation need not determine the
individual's financial ability to repay before advancing expenses.
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No indemnification may be provided, however, which would relieve
individuals from liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct.
J. Article Eleven-Amendment of Articles of Incorporationand
Bylaws1 3
Article Eleven collects in one place the provisions regarding
amendment of the articles of incorporation and bylaws.
Revised Statute 13.1-705(A) states the general proposition that a
corporation may amend its articles to add or omit any provision
that could originally be contained in, or omitted from, the articles.
Section 13.1-705(B) reinforces this right by stating that shareholders have no vested property rights as a consequence of any provision in the articles. Of course, amendments to the articles may alter shareholder expectations; but shares are held subject to this
possibility, and any change to the articles must receive the consent
of a substantial portion of the shares.
Revised Statute section 13.1-706 lists certain routine amendments which may be effected by the board without shareholder approval. These amendments include deletion of the names and addresses of the initial directors and registered agent and
accomplishment of a stock-split if only one class of shares is
outstanding.
The usual procedure for approval of amendments is contained in
Revised Statute section 13.1-707. The board may propose amendments to the articles for submission to the shareholders. 139 Under
section 13.1-707(B), the submission of an amendment to the shareholders should generally be accompanied by a recommendation of
the board that it be approved by the shareholders. However, the
board may submit the proposed amendment without recommenda138. REVISED

STATUTE,

supra note 1, §§ 13.1-705 to -715.

139. The statute does not specifically state that the board shall first approve the amendment and then propose it to the shareholders. The sections governing other significant corporate events, such as mergers, share exchanges, asset sales and dissolution, explicitly require board approval. Approval is certainly implicit in the notion that the board proposes
the amendment, however. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 10.03 official comment, clearly states
that the procedure for adoption of amendments is that they be approved by the shareholders after approval by the board. It is probably inappropriate for the shareholders to demand
a special meeting to vote on a proposed amendment which has not been previously approved
by the board since they do not have the right to initiate an amendment. However, it probably would be appropriate for the shareholders to demand a meeting for the purpose of requesting that the board consider and approve the proposed amendment and then submit it
to the shareholders.
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tion if it determines that, because of conficts of interest or other
circumstances, a recommendation is not appropriate.
Under Revised Statute section 13.1-707(C), the board is allowed
to condition its submission of an amendment on any basis. This is
an extremely important provision. Through it, the board, in its discretion, can alter the usual voting rights of the shareholders as
stated in the articles. For example, if an amendment would benefit
a certain group of shares not constituting a separate voting group,
the board could condition its submission of the amendment on approval by a certain percentage of the votes of all other shares.
All shareholders, whether or not entitled to vote, are to be given
notice of the meeting at which a proposed amendment is to be considered. The notice shall state that one purpose of the meeting is
to consider the amendment 140 and shall be accompanied by the
text of the amendment.
At the meeting, the amendment must be approved by more than
two thirds of the votes of each voting group entitled to vote on it.
This provision is consistent with Old Statute section 13.1-56. Although the normal quorum rule of a majority of the shares entitled
to vote applies, approval requires a much higher number (more
than two thirds of the shares entitled to vote, not of the votes present).' 41 The articles can require a greater or lesser percentage, but
in no event less than a simple majority of the votes cast. The directors, pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1-707(C), could require a greater percentage for approval than stated in the articles
or statute by so conditioning their submission.
Revised Statute section 13.1-708 provides for approval of the
proposed amendment by the separate voting groups in certain circumstances. Like Old Statute section 13.1-57, it provides that the
proposed amendment be approved by the requisite percentage of
shares in each voting group, voting separately. This is true even
140. This notice of purpose is necessary even if the meeting is the annual meeting which
generally does not require notice of purpose. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-658(B).
141. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 10.03, likewise requires approval of a majority of the
shares entitled to vote. The very high vote requirement in the Revised Statute may be a
mixed blessing in the takeover context. It means that any amendment, including any antitakeover defensive amendment, requires this very high vote. On the other hand, this same
rule applies to mergers, share exchanges, and sales of assets. Consequently, acquisition proposals unacceptable to relatively fewer shareholders, somewhat less than one-third of the
shares, cannot be effected. Some of these transactions would also require approval under
Article 14, Affiliated Transactions. See REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-725 to -728.
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though the shares are not generally voting shares if the amendment affects those shares in any one of nine ways, including changing the designations or rights of the shares,1 42 limiting or denying
preemptive rights, and canceling or limiting rights to accrued
distributions.
After approval by the shareholders, the corporation files articles
of amendment with the Commission, pursuant to Revised Statute
section 13.1-710. The corporation must include, among other
things, the text of the amendment and indicate the number of
votes, by voting group, cast in favor of and against its adoption, or
state that the number of votes in favor was sufficient to constitute
approval. Thereafter, the Commission will issue the certificate of
amendment.
Revised Statute section 13.1-711 allows the board, with or without shareholder approval, to restate the articles of incorporation.
This process allows the corporation to integrate its articles, including in their proper place all amendments previously approved and
eliminating the provisions replaced by those amendments.
Revised Statute section 13.1-714 establishes a more orderly procedure for amending the bylaws than that which existed under Old
The substance of the old section is not
Statute section 13.1-24.
14 3
changed, however.
Section 13.1-714 acknowledges the general proposition that the
board and the shareholders have concurrent power to amend the
bylaws. The power of the board in this regard may be limited in
two ways. First, the articles of incorporation may reserve the power
exclusively to the shareholders. If this reservation is not contained
in the initial articles, it could be added only by an amendment to
the articles, which, of course, would require board approval. The
second way of limiting the board's prerogative may be more effective. The shareholders, when amending or adopting a particular
bylaw, may expressly provide that it not be amended or repealed
by the board. If neither of these two strictures is imposed, the
board may amend or repeal a bylaw adopted by the shareholders,
142.

OLD STATUTE,

supra note 1, § 13.1-57(d), required that such a change be adverse

before separate class voting was triggered.
143. See Levisa Oil Corp. v. Quigley, 217 Va. 898, 234 S.E.2d 257 (1977) (holding that
supra note 1, § 13.1-24, prohibits directors from overriding bylaw provisions
setting quorum for shareholders' meeting); Scott County Tobacco Warehouses v. Harris, 214
Va. 508, 201 S.E.2d 780 (1974) (under OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-24, power to
amend bylaws granted to directors unless reserved to shareholders).
OLD STATUTE,

120
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and vice versa.
Bylaws establishing supermajorities for quorum or voting purposes at board meetings are dealt with separately in Revised Statute section 13.1-715. If such a provision is originally contained in a
bylaw adopted by the shareholders, only the shareholders can
change it, even though the explicit statement of shareholder exclusivity required by Revised Statute section 13.1-714 is not made. If
the provision is initially adopted by the board, either the board or
the shareholders may change it.
14 4
K. Article Twelve-Merger and Share Exchange

Article Twelve, dealing with mergers and share exchanges, does
not differ significantly from the Old Statute.
Revised Statute sections 13.1-716 and -717 authorize mergers
and share exchanges and set forth the procedures for accomplishing them substantially on the same terms as did Old Statute sections 13.1-68 and -69.1.
Revised Statute section 13.1-716(B)(3) requires that the plan of
merger state the manner of converting shares of the constituent
corporation into either shares or securities of the surviving or other
corporation, or into cash or property. Thus, cash mergers, having
the effect of eliminating some shareholders from the enterprise,
continue to be permitted. This section does not address the question whether such mergers are fair to the "frozen out" shareholders; it merely allows the transaction if it can be effected consistent
with other obligations to those shareholders.
The Revised Statute does not expressly allow different treatment of shares of the same class. The Official Comment to Model
Act section 11.01 states that it is permissible under this provision
to distinguish among shareholders even of a single class or voting
group. Under this interpretation, the plan of merger could provide
that solne shareholders accept cash while others are given securities or other property.
Section 13.1-716 does not provide for consolidation. The notion
of a consolidation seems redundant and therefore is not carried
over into the Revised Statute. Typically, it is advantageous for one
of the merger partners to survive. If survival of one constituent is
144. REVISED

STATUTE,

supra note 1, §§ 13.1-716 to -722.
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not desired, as perhaps in the case of the combination of two independent corporations of relatively the same size, the functional
equivalent of a consolidation could be achieved by having the constituents form a new corporation and then merging each constitutent into it.
Revised Statute section 13.1-717, dealing with share exchanges,
is very similar to Old Statute section 13.1-69.1 which was adopted
in 1975. In an exchange, shares of one corporation are directly exchanged for shares or securities of the other corporation or for
cash. The transaction is subject to the same safeguards as a statutory merger, such as shareholder approval and dissenters' rights. It
is a procedure whereby one entity may become the subsidiary of
another without the awkward process of a reverse triangular
merger.

145

Revised Statute section 13.1-718 sets out the procedures
whereby the shareholders may adopt a plan of merger or share exchange. It is the same procedure as governs shareholder approval
of amendments to the articles of incorporation. After approval by
the board, the plan of merger or share exchange is submitted to
the shareholders entitled to vote on it. The plan must be approved
by the affirmative vote of more than two thirds of the shares entitled to vote on it. The articles may increase this percentage or reduce it to not less than a majority of votes cast.
The plan of merger or exchange must be approved by separate
voting groups, even if the shares are not otherwise voting shares, if
the plan contains provisions which, if contained in a proposed articles amendment, would trigger separate voting. Again, the board
generally should submit the proposal to the shareholders along
with its recommendation except in conflict of interest situations or
145. In a reverse triangular merger, the acquiring corporation forms a wholly owned sub-

sidiary, providing it with cash or securities. The subsidiary is merged into the acquired corporation, and the plan of merger provides that the shareholders of the acquired corporation
(nominally the surviving entity) receive cash or the securities of the parent in exchange for

their stock. Through this procedure, the acquired corporation does not cease to exist, but
becomes a subsidiary of the acquiror.

The language of some merger statutes may not allow this procedure since the shareholders
of the surviving corporation lose their status as such. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.168(c), allowed, and REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-716, allows reverse triangular
mergers. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-68(c), provided that the manner or basis of

converting the shares of each merging corporationinto shares of the survivor or shares or
securities of any other corporationbe stated in the plan of merger. The italicized language
allowed the reverse triangular merger. It is carried over into the Revised Statute.
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other special circumstances.
The board may condition its submis146
sion on any basis.

There are some significant differences between this section and
Old Statute section 13.1-68. Revised Statute section 13.1-718(G)(3)
provides that a plan of merger need not be approved by the shareholders of the surviving corporation if certain criteria are met.
First, the articles of the surviving corporation may not differ from
its articles before the merger. Second, the shareholders in the surviving corporation must hold the same number of identical shares
as they held before the merger. Finally, the shares issued or issuable as a result of the merger must not increase the number of voting or participating shares by more than twenty percent.
Although this provision enables a corporation to avoid calling a
shareholders' meeting to approve a fairly insignificant merger, it
may be of limited importance. A surviving entity wishing to avoid
a shareholders' meeting can, as it could previously, simply form a
wholly owned subsidiary and merge the other entity into it. While
this procedure requires the acquiring party to hold a shareholder
meeting, the meeting is of the sole shareholder of the wholly owned
subsidiary.
Under Revised Statute section 13.1-718(I), the board of each
corporation may approve amendments to the plan of merger or
share exchange without resubmission to the shareholders. These
amendments may not change the amount or type of consideration
the shareholders will receive in exchange for their shares, or
change any term of the plan which would adversely affect any
shares of the corporation.
The short-form merger provision has been carried over in Revised Statute section 13.1-719, but this section is more flexible
than Old Statute section 13.1-76. A domestic or foreign corporation
owning at least ninety percent of the outstanding shares of each
class of a subsidiary's shares may merge the subsidiary into the
parent without approval of the shareholders of either
1 47

corporation.

146. If corporation A owns 60% of corporation B's shares and desires to merge B into
itself, the board of B could condition its submission of the merger on approval by a majority
of the 40% minority interest. Under the Revised Statute, only more than two thirds of all
the voting shares, including A's 60%, would be required. The separate voting rules of Article
14, Affiliated Transactions, might also apply to this example. See REVISED STATUTE, supra
note 1, § 13.1-726.
147. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-719, does not allow merger of the subsidiary

1985]

VIRGINIA STOCK CORPORATION ACT

Under the Revised Statute, a Virginia domestic subsidiary could
be merged into a foreign parent if the law of the parent's state of
incorporation allows the short-form merger. Old Statute section
13.1-76 only allowed Virginia domestic parent corporations to be
parties to short-form mergers.
Under the short-form merger statute, the board of the parent
must approve the plan of merger and send a copy of it to each
shareholder of the subsidiary unless the shareholder waives this
right in writing. After adoption of the plan, the merger is effected
like any other.
1 48
L. Article Thirteen-Sale of Assets

Article Thirteen, dealing with the sale of assets, is not significantly different from prior Virginia law. Revised Statute section
.13.1-723 authorizes sales, leases and exchanges of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets in the regular course of business
to be concluded on the terms and conditions established by the
board. It also, and separately, authorizes the mortgage or encumbrance of all or substantially all the assets for whatever purpose,
again on the terms and conditions acceptable to the board. Old
Statute section 13.1-73 allowed mortgages and encumbrances only
for the purpose of borrowing money.
The Official Comment to Model Act section 12.01, on which this
section is based, notes that the words "substantially all" are to
mean "nearly all." This seems to be a quantitative test. "All or
substantially all" is determined by the percentage of assets sold,
and it must -be a very high percentage. However, the Official Comment adds a qualitative aspect. It notes that the sale of all assets,
other than cash or near-cash, is a sale of all or substantially all the
assets.
Revised Statute section 13.1-724 governs sales of all or substantially all assets other than in the ordinary course of business. The
procedure for approving such sales is virtually the same as that for
approving amendments to the articles of incorporation, or plans of
merger or share exchanges. This section applies to the transfer of
assets regardless of the character of the transferee. The section
must be complied with even if the corporation seeks to transfer all
into another wholly owned subsidiary, but only into the parent.
148.

REVISED STATUTE,

supra note 1, §§ 13.1-723 to -724.
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or substantially all its assets not in the ordinary course of business
to a wholly owned subsidiary. 14 9 If the transfer fits within the definition of a distribution, it is governed not by this section, but by
Revised Statute section 13.1-653.
50
M. Article Fourteen-Affiliated Transactions'

Article Fourteen is a discrete set of provisions dealing with
transactions between the corporation and a potentially dominant
shareholder. This article became effective in June, 1985, and has
no analog in the Model Act.
Article Fourteen was prompted by two motives, one a bit more
altruistic than the other. First, there was a growing concern about
the unfairness to minority shareholders resulting from corporate
transactions with a controlling shareholder. By reason of his share
ownership and resulting control of the board, a majority shareholder could fix the terms of the transaction and assure its approval to the possible detriment of the minority.The second motive
was the desire to protect Virginia corporations from certain takeover tactics. 5 1
149. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 12.01, considers transfers to a wholly owned subsidiary
like a transfer in the ordinary course of business and therefore does not require shareholder
approval. This approach has some logical appeal since the assets are not transferred out of
the enterprise which the shareholders ultimately control.
The Revised Statute requires shareholder approval for this transaction. Even though the
wholly owned subsidiary (transferee) is controlled by the parent and indirectly by the shareholders, the assets are owned after the transfer by a different entity with its own legal responsibilities. The assets may be subject to different encumbrances; the financial position
and makeup of the transferor's business, which determine the legalilty of a distribution by
the parent to its shareholders, would likewise be different.
150. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-725 to -728.
151. Article 14 is Virginia's response to these concerns. Other states recently have
adopted legislation to deal with the same concerns. See, e.g., M. CORPS. & ASs'NS CODE
ANN. §§ 3-202, -601 to -603 (Repl. Vol. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, 1701.831
(Baldwin Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 408, 409.1, 910 (Purdon 1983). Some of this
legislation is in response to Edger v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), in which the Illinois
anti-takeover statute was held unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce.
See Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation?Ohio Takeover Act II, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 108
(1983); Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legislation, 43
MD. L. REV. 266 (1984); Steinberg, State Law Developments: The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Legislation, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 184 (1984). See generally Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties,
1983 Am. B. FOUND. RESE.ARCH J. 341; Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Lowenstein,
PruningDeadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249
(1983).
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This article comprises several integrated provisions, including a
very refined set of definitions. These definitions render a detailed
explanation of the article difficult. Consequently, the following discussion is general.
Under Revised Statute section 13.1-725, the holder, directly or
beneficially, of more than ten percent of the outstanding voting
shares of a corporation is deemed to be an "interested shareholder." An interested shareholder can be an individual, corporation or other holder. The term does not include the corporation
itself, any of its subsidiaries, or any of the corporation's various
employee stock ownership or benefit plans.
Certain significant corporate transactions between the corporation and the interested shareholder are "affiliated transactions."
These corporate transactions include mergers, share exchanges,
sales not in the ordinary course of business of assets having a fair
market value of more than five percent of the corporation's assets,
guarantees of indebtedness of the interested shareholder if in an
amount more than five percent of the corporation's assets, sales of
any voting shares having an aggregate fair market value in excess
of five percent of the fair market value of all outstanding voting
shares, and dissolution.
The article sets forth two correlative provisions. The first states
a general rule governing the approval of affiliated transactions, and
the second, a series of exemptions from that stringent rule.
Revised Statute section 13.1-726 establishes the general rule that
affiliated transactions must be approved by the affirmative vote of
two thirds of the voting shares other than the shares owned by the
interested shareholder. This voting rule is in addition to, not in
lieu of, the other voting provisions in the statute or articles. This
separate voting rule tends to protect minority shareholders since a
very sizable percentage of the minority must approve the transaction before it can be concluded.1 52
The voting rule also discourages hostile takeovers. Of course, the
article does not apply to the tender offer itself; but it would apply
to the second phase of the acquisition, such as a merger. Regardless of the percentage of voting shares owned by the acquiror, the
152. If this article applied to the merger example in footnote 146, the transaction would
require approval of more than two thirds of the shares entitled to vote, pursuant to REVISED
STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-718, and two thirds of the disinterested 40%, pursuant to
REVISED STATuTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-726.
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second phase would require the approval of a substantial majority
of those shares other than the acquiror's. An acquiror may be discouraged from making the initial tender offer if he realizes that he
may not be able to acquire one hundred percent of the entity.
Revised Statute section 13.1-727 contains a series of exemptions
from the separate voting rule. As a result, the voting rule does not
apply if: (1) the corporation has three hundred or fewer shareholders; 153 (2) the transaction has been approved by a majority of the
disinterested directors; 54 or (3) the interested shareholder owns
ninety percent of the voting stock or has owned at least eighty percent for five years.
A separate, and extremely technical, exemption is the "fair
price" provision of Revised Statute section 13.1-727(6). In general,
this provision exempts from the separate voting rule affiliated
transactions in which the shareholders receive "fair value" for their
shares. Fair value is determined by a series of calculations which
are drafted to ensure that all shareholders receive the higher of the
following for their shares: (1) the same dollar value as the interested shareholder paid for other shares of the same class during a
two-year period; or (2) the fair value of the shares on the date the
155
proposed transaction is announced to the public.
Article Fourteen will apply unless a contrary amendment to the
articles is adopted. Any such amendment must be approved by two
thirds of the voting shares other than those owned by any interested shareholder.
153. The provision exempts affiliated transactions from the special voting rule of REVISED
supra note 1, § 13.1-726, if there were not more than 300 shareholders at any time
during the three years before the announcement. Therefore, if the corporation had partially
"gone private" within that time, with the result that there were fewer than 300 shareholders, this exemption would not be available.
154. Consequently, a "friendly" acquisition through tender offer and merger, or merger
alone, approved by the requisite percentage of disinterested directors, escapes the special
voting rule of REviSED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-726.
155. This "fair price" amendment is designed to protect Virginia corporations from frontloaded, two-tier takeovers. In such takeovers, the acquiror typically makes a cash tender
offer for a stated number of the target's shares (sufficient to give the acquiror control, perhaps 51%) and states its intent to follow up the tender offer with a merger in which the
remaining shares may receive substantially less consideration than the first group. This approach is intended to have a stampede effect, assuring the acquiror of obtaining 51%. It
enables the acquiror to conclude the acquisition at a lesser overall cost than if all shares
received the same consideration as that provided the first 51%. See Scriggins & Clarke,
supra note 151, at 266-67. This fair price amendment is similar to the Maryland statute. See
supra note 151.
STATUTE,
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It is important to note that Article Fourteen applies to all Virginia corporations, not only to large, publicly held corporations.
The exemption for three-hundred-or-fewer-shareholder corporations only exempts them from the separate voting procedure of Revised Statute section 13.1-726. The article therefore serves as a
guide, even for the small corporation, to what affiliated transacand how the corporation and shareholders can deal with
tions are
156
them.
N.

" 7
15
Article Fifteen-Dissenters'Rights

Article Fifteen contains the appraisal procedures. In the past,
the issue of appraisal rights has evoked two principal criticisms.
First, from the perspective of a dissenting shareholder, the proceeding was thought to be highly technical, expensive and risky.
Second, corporate management argued that the procedure was
fraught with the potential for nuisance suits.15 8 The Model Act
identifies two competing interests which its dissenters' rights provisions attempt to accommodate. 5 e Management must have the
right to enter new lines of business and to readjust the rights of
some or all of the shares in order to accomplish legitimate corporate goals. On the other hand, shareholders opposing management
and shareholder majority decisions ought to have some means of
withdrawing from the enterprise with the fair value of their shares.
This latter point is especially critical in the closely held corporation setting, where there is no ready market for the shares.1 0°
The Revised Statute and the Model Act attempt to address
these concerns by redesigning the concept of dissenters' rights. The
provisions in Article Fifteen establish a procedure for judicial appraisal of value. This procedure is the final, but hopefully unneces156. For example, the board can condition its submission of merger or sale of asset proposals on affirmative approval on the terms required by REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §
13.1-726.
157. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-729 to -741.
158. See generally MODEL AcT, supra note 4, ch. 13 introductory comment; Committee on
Corporation Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Association, Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct Affecting Dissenters' Rights, 32
Bus. LAW. 1855 (1977); Conard, Amendments of Model Business CorporationAct Affecting
Dissenters' Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80 and 81), 33 Bus. LAW. 2587 (1978).
159. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, ch. 13 introductory comment, at 316-17.
160. A dissenting shareholder in a closely held corporation cannot exercise the "Wall
Street exception" and simply sell his shares for what the market perceives to be their fair
value.
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sary, method of determining fair value. The article is structured so
as to encourage a mutually acceptable determination of fair value
without judicial intervention. It is believed that this new procedure
will be more expeditious and less expensive than the prior system
of appraisal. The procedure is still, however, very precise with numerous specific requirements and timing provisions. Failure to
meet the deadlines, or to follow the procedure exactly, terminates
the shareholder's ability to receive payment for his shares pursuant to this article.
Revised Statute section 13.1-730(A) states that a shareholder has
a right to dissent and obtain payment of fair value for his shares in
four corporate transactions: (1) consummation of a plan of merger
requiring shareholder approval if the shareholder is entitled to
vote on the merger or is a shareholder of the constituent corporation to a short-form merger; (2) consummation of a plan of share
exchange if the shareholder is a shareholder in the acquired corporation and is entitled to vote on the plan; (3) sale of substantially
all the assets of the corporation other than in the ordinary course
of business if the shareholder is entitled to vote on the proposed
sale, unless the sale is pursuant to court order or is for cash followed within a year by a distribution of the cash to the shareholders; and (4) any other transaction for which the articles, bylaws or
a resolution of the board provide dissenters' rights.
A beneficial owner of shares can exercise the dissenters' rights
conferred by this article if he submits to the corporation the record
owner's written consent to the dissent.
A "Wall Street exception" is contained in Revised Statute section 13.1-730(C). Unless the articles otherwise provide, there are
no dissenters' rights in favor of the holders of any class of shares
listed on a national securities exchange or held by at least two
thousand record holders. However, the holders of such shares are
afforded dissenters' rights if the transaction is an affiliated transaction or when, upon consummation of the transaction, these shareholders would receive something other than cash or shares of a corporation which are also listed on a national exchange or held of
record by at least two thousand shareholders.
Revised Statute section 13.1-730(B)(a) provides that a shareholder entitled to dissent under this article may not challenge the
corporate action giving rise to the right unless the action is unlawful or fraudulent. This section is intended to make the dissenters'
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right exclusive. It will succeed on this point only if the terms "unlawful" and "fraudulent" are narrowly construed."6 '
The appraisal procedure contains six separate steps. First, as
provided in Revised Statute section 13.1-732, if the transaction
giving rise to the dissenters' right is to be voted on at a shareholders' meeting, notice of the meeting shall contain a statement to the
effect that the shareholders may be entitled to assert dissenters'
rights and shall be accompanied by a copy of Article Fifteen. If the
transaction is concluded without shareholder action, the dissenters'
notice described in Revised Statute section 13.1-734 must be sent
within ten days of the effective date of the transaction.
If the transaction in question requires shareholder approval, a
shareholder planning to exercise his right to dissent must deliver
written notice of his intention to the corporation before the vote is
taken. The shareholder must not then vote the shares in favor of
the transaction.
Next, during the ten days following the effective date of the
transaction, the corporation, pursuant to Revised Statute section
13.1-734, must send notice to all shareholders who have asserted
dissenters' rights. The notice must state, among other things, when
and where the shareholder must send his demand for payment and
tender his shares. This dissenters' notice must also set a date, between thirty and sixty days after delivery of the notice, as the date
by which the shareholder must submit a payment demand.
Within thirty days after receipt of the payment demand submitted by the shareholder in reply to the dissenters' notice, the corporation shall pay the dissenter the amount it estimates to be the fair
value of the shares, plus accrued interest. This payment is to be
accompanied by financial statements and an explanation of how
the corporation determined the fair value.
If a shareholder is dissatisfied with the corporation's payment
offer, he may notify the corporation within thirty days of his estimate of the fair value and demand payment of his estimate.
If the parties do not agree on the fair value, the corporation shall
institute a court proceeding to determine the fair value. The court
will award the dissenter judgment in the amount it has determined
to be fair value. Court costs for this proceeding, including the com161. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of

the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1964).
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pensation of any appraisers appointed by the court, shall be borne
by the corporation, except to the extent the court finds that the
dissenter did not act in good faith. The court may also award
counsel fees to the dissenter if it finds that the corporation did not
comply with the procedures or may award counsel fees against either party if it finds that the party did not act in good faith.
6 2

0. Article Sixteen-Dissolution

Article Sixteen changes the terminology used in conjunction
with, and some of the procedures for, dissolving a corporation.
These changes were made to conform to the Model Act scheme;
however, there are not many substantive changes from the Old
Statute.6 3
Revised Statute section 13.1-742 addresses dissolution by voluntary action of the directors and shareholders. This section is
drafted consistent with those provisions governing board and
shareholder approval of amendments to the articles, mergers or
share exchanges, and sales of assets other than in the ordinary
course of business. The Official Comment to Model Act section
14.02 notes that only shares having general voting rights have the
164
right to vote on a dissolution.
After the dissolution is authorized, the corporation files, pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1-743, articles of dissolution with
the Commission. The Commission in turn issues a certificate placing the corporation "in dissolution."
In essence, these procedures differ from the Old Statute only in
terminology. Under Old Statute section 13.1-82, after approval of
dissolution by the shareholders, the corporation submitted to the
Commission a statement of intent to dissolve. Once the Commission filed this statement, the same status was achieved as now occurs under the Revised Statute when the Commission issues the
certificate of dissolution. However, a certificate issued under the
Revised Statute does not terminate corporate existence as did the
certificate of dissolution issued under the Old Statute.
STATUTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-742 to -756.
163. See generally Gusky, Dissolution, Forfeiture,and Liquidation of Virginia Corporations, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 333 (1978).
164. Other shares do not vote on a dissolution, on the theory that the rights of other
shares are fixed in the articles. Dissolution does not change these fixed rights, but merely
triggers some of them, such as a liquidation preference.

162. REVISED
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Revised Statute section 13.1-745 states the consequence of being
"in dissolution." A corporation in dissolution exists for the limited
purpose of winding-up and liquidating its business and affairs. The
corporation may not carry on any business other than that appropriate to this limited purpose. It may collect its assets, discharge
and provide for its liabilities, and distribute remaining assets to its
shareholders.
Revised Statute section 13.1-747 addresses the grounds for judicial dissolution at the request of a shareholder or creditor. Any
shareholder may institute a proceeding requesting dissolution on
the same grounds as previously stated in Old Statute section 13.194. The provision relating to dissolution for fraudulent or oppressive conduct remains substantively the same as in the Old
165
Statute.
The "dissolution for deadlock" provision has been broadened,
however. Revised Statute section 13.1-747(A)(1) provides that a
shareholder can request dissolution if there is a management deadlock and "irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and affairs of the corporation can no
longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally."16' 8 In addition, a shareholder deadlock, resulting in the inability to elect directors at two successive annual meetings, is
grounds for the proceeding without any showing of additional
167
harm.
In a judicial dissolution proceeding, the court may appoint receivers or custodians pursuant to Revised Statute section 13.1-748.
This section, unlike Old Statute section 13.1-94, allows the court to
appoint custodians without an explicit finding that to do so is in
the best interest of both the shareholders and creditors. The Re165. This provision is remedial in nature and is liberally construed to allow shareholders

relief in addition to that provided by corporate bylaws. See Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., 216
Va. 22, 216 S.E.2d 18 (1975); White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972).
166. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-747(A)(1)(a). This provision is more flexible
than its antecedent, OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-94(a)(1), which allowed dissolution
only when "irreparable injury to the corporation [was] being suffered or [was] threatened by
[the deadlock in management]."
167. OLD STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-94(a)(3), had a comparable provision, but it required a showing of harm. As provided in REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-677(A), the
terms of directors expire at the next annual shareholders' meeting, unless the terms are
staggered. REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-677(E), however, states that incumbent
directors continue to serve (unless they resign) until their successors are elected. Therefore,
the "deadlock in the election of directors" provision of REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, §
13.1-747, does not mean that the corporation has been without directors for two years.
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vised Statute broadens the custodian's power by allowing him to
exercise all corporate powers, either through or in place of the
board or officers, in order that he may manage the business in the
best interest of the shareholders and creditors.
After a hearing, if the court finds one of the grounds for judicial
dissolution, it may enter a decree directing that the corporation be
dissolved. The decree is transmitted to the Commission, which
then enters an order of involuntary dissolution. Thereafter the
court directs the winding-up and the distribution of assets. The
court will advise the Commission when the corporation has been
liquidated, at which point the Commission will issue an order terminating existence.1 6 8
After a corporation has paid, or made provision for, its debts and
has distributed its remaining assets to its shareholders, it must file
articles of termination of corporate existence with the Commission.
Thereafter, the Commission issues a certificate of termination of
corporate existence at which time corporate existence ceases. 169
Revised Statute section 13.1-755 carries over substantively the
same provision as Old Statute section 13.1-101 regarding survival
of remedies after termination of corporate existence. This section
provides for the survival of rights or claims existing, and liabilities
incurred, before termination. Rights or claims coming into existence after termination are not covered by this statute.
P.

70

Article Seventeen-Foreign Corporations

The major change made within Article Seventeen is the elimination of the joint and several liability of directors, officers and
agents on certain contracts and for torts of corporations doing business in Virginia without registration. The elimination of this harsh
penalty is reasonable, considering the difficulty in defining what
activities constitute "transacting business" so as to require
registration.
168. REVISED

STATUTE,

supra note 1, § 13.1-749.

169. Id. § 13.1-750.
170. Id. §§ 13.1-757 to -769.
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Q. Article Eighteen-Records and Reports"1
Revised Statute section 13.1-770, which lists the categories of
records a corporation must maintain, is more explicit than the
comparable provision in Old Statute section 13.1-47. As stated in
Revised Statute section 13.1-770 (A) through (D), a corporation
must maintain a permanent record of all action by the shareholders and directors, including action by board committees and action
by written consent. A list of the names and addresses of the shareholders, alphabetized by class of shares, and "appropriate" accounting records are also required. Revised Statute section 13.1770(E) requires the corporation to keep separate copies of certain
materials, even though they may also fit within the records-retention provisions of subsections (A) through (D). These materials include the articles, bylaws and amendments currently in effect; certain board resolutions creating classes or series of shares, or fixing
their relative rights; minutes of shareholders' meetings and record
of all shareholder action without a meeting for the most recent
three years; all communications to shareholders during the most
recent three years, including financial statements; and the corporation's most recent report to the Commission.
Revised Statute section 13.1-771 confers upon the shareholders
two separate inspection rights, each keyed to the category of
records set forth in Revised Statute section 13.1-770. Shareholders
have a virtually automatic right under Revised Statute section
13.1-771(A) to inspect the materials listed in section 13.1-770(E)
upon five days prior written notice. No showing of proper purpose
is required. Because these records are either public documents or
relate to the shareholder's status, the statute confers a very broad
right to inspect these documents. The right to inspect includes the
right to copy, and the corporation is authorized to charge the reasonable cost of reproducing the records.
Under Revised Statute section 13.1-771(B), a shareholder may
inspect the other records referred to in Revised Statute section
13.1-770(A) through (D), including the accounting records, shareholder lists and records of board action-likewise on five days written request. There are, however, several preconditions to the exercise of this right. The individual must have been a shareholder of
record for at least six months or own five percent of all outstanding
171. Id. §§ 13.1-770 to -775.
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shares; he must make his demand in good faith and for a proper
purpose, describing with reasonable particularity both his purpose
and the records he desires to inspect; and the records sought must
be directly related to the stated purpose.
The inspection rights conferred by Revised Statute section 13.1771 are limited to the documents specified in subsections (A) and
(B). These two subsections do not exhaust the shareholder's inspection rights, however. Revised Statute section 13.1-771(E)
states that subsections (A) and (B) do not affect a shareholder's
right, as a litigant against the corporation, to exercise the same inspection rights as other litigants. Section 13.1-771(E) also acknowledges the power of a court, independent of section 13.1-771, to
compel the production of corporate documents. This latter provision preserves the shareholder's common law inspection rights.
Revised Statute section 13.1-773 grants shareholders the right to
institute a court action to enforce either of the inspection rights
conferred by section 13.1-771(A) and (B). The court may assess
costs and counsel fees against the corporation if the shareholder
proves that the corporation refused inspection without a reasonable basis for doubting the shareholder's right to inspect the demanded records. The shareholder bears the burden of proof; and
the award of costs and fees against the corporation is a matter of
court discretion. For both of these reasons, the judicial enforcement provision favors the corporation. Model Act section 16.04 is
more advantageous to the shareholder. The Model Act requires the
corporation to pay the shareholder's costs, including counsel fees,
unless the corporation can prove that its refusal of inspection was
in good faith based on a reasonable doubt.
Revised Statute section 13.1-774 requires a corporation to furnish to any shareholder, upon demanding it, a set of its financial
statements for the most recent fiscal year, including a balance
sheet, income statement, and statement of changes in shareholder
equity. If the financial statements are reported on by a public accounting, his report must accompany them. Otherwise, the president or officer responsible for the accounting records must provide
an explanation of the basis of accounting used in preparing the
statements and a description of any respects in which the statements are not prepared on a basis consistent with the prior year's.
This right to financial statements generally follows the approach
of Old Statute section 13.1-47. The Revised Statute differs from
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Model Act section 16.20, which requires the corporation, to furnish

all shareholders the financial statements, and thus represents a
compromise. Management is concerned about both the effort required to prepare and disseminate this information to shareholders
who may not be interested in it and about the liability attendant
to dissemination of this information if it is in any respect inaccurate. Section 13.1-774 purports to alleviate these concerns by requiring that the information be sent only to those shareholders requesting it.
The management explanation of the accounting basis is a more
serious concern. The statute does not give any guidance as to the
specificity required in this explanation. Presumably, a particularized description is not required. The Official Comment to Model
Act section 16.20 acknowledges that the person furnishing this
statement often will not be a trained accountant and that he
should not be held to the standard of a professional. It notes, however, that the description of accounting bases should follow the
guidelines of the accounting profession for reporting on a format
72
which departs from generally accepted accounting principles.
While section 13.1-774 may impose some burden, particularly on
small corporations, all shareholders ought to be able to obtain financial information, and an understanding of the bases on which it
was prepared, without exercising their formal inspection rights.
Moreover, the distribution provisions of Revised Statute sections
13.1-653 and -692 require that much of this same information be
prepared to determine the legality of a distribution.
R. Article

Nineteen-Proceeding for

173

Determination

of

Shareholders

Article Nineteen sets forth a procedure by which a corporation
can determine the identity of its shareholders. When the board believes the corporate records no longer accurately reflect the ownership of the corporation's shares, the board may commence a suit in
equity requesting the court to determine the identity of its proper
shareholders. After a hearing, the court shall determine the iden172. For example, if the entity uses the cash basis of accounting, the description of the
statement of receipts and disbursements might state that it was prepared on the cash basis
and that it presents the cash receipts and disbursements of the entity during the period, but
that it does not purport to present the results of operation on the accrual basis.
173. REVISED STATuTE, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-776 to -777.
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tity of the corporation's shareholders; this determination is final.
74
S. Article Twenty- Transition Proceedings"

Finally, Article Twenty contains the transition provisions. Revised Statute section 13.1-778 states that the Revised Statute applies on its effective date to all corporations and that the articles of
all corporations, organized before or after its effective date, are
subject to it. However, section 13.1-779 states that rights or liabilities acquired or incurred before the effective date are not affected
by the Revised Statute.
The articles and bylaws of all Virginia corporations were structured in reliance on prior Virginia law. Care has been taken
throughout the Revised Statute not to unduly upset these expectations. Few provisions have been changed in a way that rights conferred by the Old Statute (which therefore needed no articulation
in the articles) now exist only if specifically provided in the articles. Otherwise, amendments to the articles would be required to
restore these rights. For example, the preemptive rights provisions
of Revised Statute section 13.1-650 were retained in the "opt out"
version for precisely this reason. Under Old Statute section 13.123, if a corporation desired preemptive rights, it did not need a
provision for them in the articles because it could instead rely on
the statutory right. If the Revised Statute had followed the Model
75
Act, preemptive rights would exist only if stated in the articles.1
An amendment to the articles would be required to restore these
rights, and such an amendment might be difficult to accomplish.
One instance in which this general approach was not followed
involves the shareholders' right to demand a special meeting.
Under the Old Statute, the holders of ten percent of the shares
could demand a meeting. Under the Revised Statute, shareholders
in corporations with over thirty-five shareholders have lost this
right unless they are able to cause an amendment to be adopted
restoring it.1' 6
In some instances, enabling provisions authorized by the Old
Statute have been preempted by the Revised Statute. For example,
the Old Statute allowed provisions in the articles which lowered
174. Id. §§ 13.1-778 to -800.
175. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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the quorum provision for shareholder meetings to one-third. The
Revised Statute seems to sanction provisions raising, but not lowering, this percentage.177 A provision lowering the quorum could
remain in the articles, but it would not be effective. The Revised
Statute has preempted it. 17 8 The reverse has also occurred. The
Revised Statute allows a provision in the articles that directors can
be removed only for cause;17 9 the Old Statute did not explicitly
allow such a provision. 8 0
The greatest areas of change effected by the Revised Statute are
in its treatment of the consequences of certain conduct, such as the
change in assenting to board action, and, more importantly, its totally different or new treatment of certain subjects. The financial,
standard of care, derivative suit and affiliated transactions provisions are all substantive departures from, or additions to, prior
Virginia corporate law.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

It will be extremely interesting to observe the application of the
Revised Statute in practice and its judicial amplification. The first
step in its application requires careful consideration by corporate
managers, shareholders, counsel and others of the statute's implications for the structure of existing corporations and for the planning of corporate action.

177.
178.
179.
180.

See REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-668(A).
See supra text accompanying note 61.
REVISED STATUTE, supra note 1, § 13.1-680(A).
See supra pg. 98.

